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INrRODUcrION 
The early 19th Century was a period of rrassive change in Latin 
lImerica. Within the first fifty years of that century, independence fran a 
colonial system and entry into a free trade era were begun. New 
governrrents were created, treaties were signed, and relations with a 
broader spectrum of foreign powers were initiated. According to soc1.0­
economic analysis by what are known as dependency theorists, that period 
also marked the beginnings of a neo-mercantilist relationship between the 
new, less developed Latin lImerican nations and more established, 
developed nations. This thesis will, in part, investigate that claim. It 
will do so as an ancillary strain of the principal concern of the thesis, 
namely a critical and analytical reconstruction of a specific event: 
William Walker's expedition into Nicaragua between 1855-7. 
Dependency theory as presented by its proponents is an explanation of 
how and why industrialiZed nations have benefitted fran the 
underdevelopment of export-oriented economies. One description of the 
theory is contained within an article by Michael J. Francis titled 
"Dependency: Ideology, Fad, and Fact." That description allo.vs that, 
'Dependency is a situation in which a certain group of countries 
have their economies conditioned by the developrent and expansion 
of another country's economy. The relationship of interdependency 
between two or more economies, and between these and v.urld 
camerce, asSlJI1)2 S a dependent nature when sane countries (the 
dominant) can expand and be self-startiny, while at the same time 
the others (the dependent ones) can only act as a reflection of 
this expansion, an expansion that can have positive or negative 
influence on the dependent countries' developrrent. In whatever 
form, the basic situation of dependency produces a global 
situation in which the dependent countries are placed in a 
backward situation and under the exploitation of the daninant 
countries. 
The dominant countries thus ilTlp:)se a daninant technology, 
ccmrerce, capital, and socio-political values on the dependent 
countries (to varying degrees in various historical manents) that 
permits them to imfXJse conditions of exploitation and to extract 
1 • 
part of the surpl us produced by the dependent countries. 
Dependency, then, is founded on an international division of 
labor that permits the industrial developrent of some countries 
and limits this same process in others, submitting them to 
conditions and restraints imposed by the centers of world 
danination.' 1 
Joseph A. Kahl, in his Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency in 
Latin America draws a connection between dependency and imperialism that 
is reminiscent of Lenin's concept of neo-imperialism. 2 In doing so, he 
develops a linkage between the need for state 1X>licy and attempts to 
implant dependency. 
The associations between the origins of dependency and 19th Century 
Latin Arrerican history is rrade in the writings of various dependency 
theorists. Andre Gunter Frank states In his Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin Arrerica: Historical Studies in Chile and Brazil 
that, " ... [dependence was] implanted in the colonial epoch and deepened 
In the free-trade era, the structure of underdeveloprrent was consolidated 
in Latin Arrerica by 19th century imperialist trade and finance." 3 
Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, in their Dependency and Developnent 
In Latin Arrerica, agree with Frank in that they believe that, " 
dependence on the social-1X>litical level also began historically with the 
expansion of the economies of the early capitalist countries." 4 
Based upon such assertions, dependency should have begun in the 
afterrrath of the 19th Century independence rrovement. If this is true, the 
evidence of this incipient dependence should be discernible. 
William Walker's expedition should be a fertile source of examples of 
such incipient dependency. This is because that expedition was grounded in 
lx>th the 1X>litical desires of Manifest Destiny and the pragrratic econanics 
of a cross-isthmus connection between the Atlantic and Pacific OCeans 
during the crucial years just i:efore the U.S. Civil war. Walker's actions 
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caused a war in Central America, brought the United States and England to 
the brink of war, effected a significant economic relationship, and 
influenced diplanatic relations between Nicaragua and the U.S. for years 
afterward. 
Because of these various actions and reactions, this episode in 
inter-American relations provides instances of many of the basic elements 
of the putative dependency relationships alluded to above. There were 
governments seeking econanic advantage, businessmen seeking profitable 
investments, trade treaties negotiated, and military force used. It was a 
brief and intense period when economic interests were Ultimately 
controlled by policy decisions. 
In	 attempting to discover whether the premise of incipient dependency 
In the 19th Century is factual, case study data will be fitted to a 
framework gleaned fran the works of selected dependency theorists. That 
dependency framework consists of the following premises: 
1. There is collusion between governmental and econanic elites 
In the developed, dcrninant nation along with a trend 
toward collusion between them and counterpart, "collaborative" 
elites in the dependent nation; 
2.	 There is a use of military force to support the political 
and economic interests of the dominant nation or nations; 
3.	 There is the negotiation of treaties that are favorable to 
the dominant nation (s) at the expense of the dependent nation; 
4.	 There is exploitation of the dependent nation by interests 
of the daninant nation ranging from extractive policies to 
plain cheating. 5 
These four criteria of dependency will be used to determine whether 
the Walker intervention in Central American affairs and related events 
3. 
show evidence of a state-directed u.s. policy to prorrote dependency 
there. The data should provide the evidence to determine whether 
dependency theorist claims of incipient dependency can be rre.intained by 
this kind of study of Central A!rerican history during the 1850 's. 
The case study approach for such research, as used in this thesis, 
has b2en proposed by Joseph A. Kahl in his took Modernization, 
Exploitation and Dependency in Latin Arrerica. Kahl reccmnends the use of a 
case study approach, centered around a specific political decision with an 
economic basis, for empirical investigations of dependency theory. 6 
While the Walker expedition was a specific political and econorrric 
event of short duration, it did occur within an evolving political and 
econamc continuum that was finnly grounded in previous actions. Walker's 
entry into Nicaragua can only be understood in the context of previous 
events. Likewise, the economic, cultural, and diplomatic changes resulting 
fran the expedition, can best be viewed in canParison to the previous 
relationships. Therefore, tefore investigating Walker's irrpact upon 
Central America, the culmination of the events leading up to Walker's 
entry into that region will be presented. 
Those events will te introduced without reference to dependency 
theory in order to simplify this complex case of American intervention as 
much as posible. A review of the case study material in light of the 
pertinent dependency framework will be attempted in the conclusion. 
4.
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PRELUDE 'ID WALKER'S EXPEDITION 
During 1821, Nicaraguans began following the lead of the rest of 
Latin Arrerica and declared independence from the Spanish Crown. HC1iJever, 
unlike most Latin Americans organizing independence movements, Central 
Arrericans did not have to field armies to wrestle control of their land 
from Spanish forces. Their independence was granted them via decree rather 
than rebellion. This lack of anned conflict saved lives, but it also 
created several problems in the region after the Spanish colonial 
government was dissolved. The greatest of these was a lack of central 
authority. 
When Central Americans declared their independence fran Spain, they 
lacked overarching unity. There was no regional organization announclIlg 
independence and, therefore, no government to assume control at first. 
Since the economy of that region had been centered at Guatamala City, a 
group of representatives fran the various cities and towns of Central 
Arrerica gathered there to decide upon a course of action. 
It was in that city that first efforts toward government were nade. 
A popular choice was union with the richer Mexican Empire to the north. 
This course was reluctantly abandoned after a coup replaced the IvExican 
Emp2ror, Iturbide, b2fore any agreerrents could be signed. Next, Central 
Americans atterrpted a more liberal idea: they organized into a federal 
rep...1blic made up of Guatama1a , Honduras, 1::1 salvador, Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua. This form of government was adopted in 1823. 7 
Unfortunately, that central government could not overcame regionalism 
or enforce revenue plans. Local rebellions erupted. These soon grew into a 
civil war. Factions developed under various rebel leaders. Slowly this 
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warfare coalesced into a conflict between two rival factions over two 
major issues. The two rivals were known as the Literals, who were fighting 
for the republic, and the Conservatives, who were fighting for state 
independence. The two rna.jor issues were states' rights versus federal 
control and the degree of church control in the republic. 
This warfare continued for years. In the end, the Central Arrerican 
Federation dissolved and various state governments began to pursue their 
own courses. There were two important results of that warfare that played 
a part in Walker's arrival in the summer of 1855. These were: 
1.	 Liberals vere not convinced of their inability to force a 
Central American republic on their rivals. There had not 
been an overall victory by the Conservatives. 
2.	 Conservatives and Liberals were bitter enemies. The civil 
conflicts over federalism had created a factionalism that 
split families and villages over a willingness to reform 
and rejection of Church daninance in government by Liberals 
and a rnaintainance of traditions by Conservatives. This split 
was so violent that the two factions could only live in like 
ideological communities. This meant that whole communities 
became either Liberal or Conservative. 
British interests were active in the region throughout this period. 
The British vere the first rna.ritime power to replace Spanish trade with 
their own. Basically, the English were motivated by profitability of 
trade rather than any ideological beliefs. This led to their dealing with 
any group holding power where the British had economic interests. While 
the Central American Federation was a viable governing body, the British 
Consul, one Frederick Chatfield, attempted to secure favorable trade 
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agreanents and support that governrrent. HCM'ever, when it was rrore 
expedient to deal with one of the individual states to gain an advantage 
for England, then British policy, personified by Chatfield, would switch 
with surprising speed to deal with whoever could supply rrore favorable 
terms. Chatfield had the option to deal with whatever faction gave the 
most benefit, but he was not always supported in London. 'fhat vicissitude 
is best illustrated by Chatfield's attempt to help English logging 
interests. 
In september 1837, Chatfield announced to Central Americans, via 
local newspapers, that England thereafter considered all the Mosquito 
Shore (the easternmost Atlantic coast of Honduras and Nicaragua) and its 
inhabitants to be a British protectorate. 8 This was an effort to protect 
English commercial interests. The mahogany that grew along that coast was 
rather valuable. English loggers, active in the area for many years, had a 
considerable interest in taking over the ccncessions for cutting that wocrl 
and in removing tariffs associated with extraction of that lumber. The 
protectorate claim was in response to central Americans attempts to 
extend more control into the coastal areas and extract nahogany for 
themselves. Chatfield's protectorate was an attempt to remove that threat 
to British logging interests. Unfortunately for the British Consul, the 
Foreign Office in London would not support his claims. Chatfield was 
forced to reverse himself. 
The 1837 claim was apparently guided solely by Chatfield's desire to 
help Ehgl ish rrerchants collect rrahogany. There does not seem to have been 
any conoerns over a canal across the isthmus, as was the case later. This 
interest can, therefore, be dated from an interesting attempt to gain land 
grants for such a canal at about tre same time. 
An Arrerican named George Holdship began negotiating with Nicaraguan 
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officials for land grants to construct a canal through Nicaragua in return 
for a loan shortly after Chatfield's September announcement. 9 Holdship 
was acting as the agent of a trading house kno.vn as the House of Soulett 
and Murat of New Orleans. This carpany was willing to loan a considerable 
arrount of noney to the Nicaraguan governrTEnt in return for the grant. 
However, Holdship's interest in canal building did not sustain itself. 
Holdship failed to get his concession, because Chatfield was able to 
circumvent the negotiations by claiming that Nicaragua was responsible for 
one sixth of the old republic's debt to England. Therefore, Chatfield 
refused to allow any loans from Americans until Ehglish creditors had 
been satisfied. 10 Holdship, stYmied by Chatfield's argument, deParted 
empty-handed. The negotiations ended and the trading house apParently lost 
interest. 
This interest by Chatfield in extending British control over the 
Atlantic coastal plains and countering Holdship's negotiations is 
important for two basic reasons. The first is that Chatfield, in 
attempting to counter Central Arrerican control in the Mosquito Shore, was 
not supported in London. This failure to support their consul is a strong 
indication of official British disinterest in expanding their dominion or 
Naval budget for localized business concerns. The second is that there was 
no rrention of a possible canal until after Holdship had rret with the 
Nicaraguans. It is, therefore, reasonable to date British interest in 
Nicaraguan canals from Holdship's visit to Nicaragua, rather than 
Chatfield's desire to control the Mosquito Shore. It is also reasonable to 
assume that Ehgland was not interested in extending her dominion into the 
region beyond a trade relationship. 
Those negotiations by Holdship were well received by Nicaraguans 
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because such a canal had been an on-again, off-again plan under Spanish 
rule during the colonial period. There was never any construction, only 
surveys and discussions. HONever, the potential financial gains kept 
Nicaraguans interested in having a canal. When Holdship came to Nicaragua, 
his efforts were a renewal of that old idea. Unfortunately, the 
Nicaraguans long-term interest was not mirrored by Holdship and his 
unknown bosses. 
In 1837, there was little reason to undertake such a monumental task. 
There was, in fact, no sustained interest in the canal after 1837 by 
Holdship or his sponsors. Whatever motivated. the canal schene was not 
enough to maintain the interest. This brief event is shrouded in mystery 
because of the lack of any record other than Chatfield's letter. 
Holdship's negotiations over a possible canal apparently served to spark 
Chatfield's interest in canals. 
That interest in canals was put aside in the face of more i..Intx>rtant 
events shortly after Holdship returned to Ne.v Orleans. Warfare flared. up 
In Guatarrala. The Central American Federation began to fall apart that 
year. By April 1838, Nicaraguan Liberals in Leon broke away from the old 
regime and declared themsel ves indePendent of any republic of Central 
Arrerican states. They claimed to act as a sovereign state. That 
independence was guaranteed by the fall of the republic the next year. At 
that point, Nicaraguans \\Bre free to control both their country and the 
customshouses. 11 
Within a year of the Nicaraguan secession, the other four countries 
follONed with their o.vn declarations of independence. This created the 
five separate countries that exist today. It also marked an end to 
agreements signed by the old republic. 
Chatfield became deeply involved with trying to hold together the 
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Central American Federation. He was apparently guided by a desire to 
maintain British interests, guaranteed under ear lier agreerrents signed by 
the republic. While Britain had never officially recognized the republic, 
it obviously believed it was in its best interest to maintain the whole of 
the parts, with the past treaties intact, rather than re-negotiate new 
treaties with five separate states. As a part of his efforts to preserve 
the republic and maintain British interests, Chatfield refused to honor 
either new Nicaraguan concessions or nullification of any existing 
guarantees along the Mosquito Shore without his prior approval. 
Chatfield's actions with resp2ct to the past treaties concerning that 
coastline were not deterred by Foreign Office shortsightedness after the 
dissolution of the Central American Federation. He worked diligently to 
avoid any possibility of Nicaraguan rejection of the earlier federal 
treaties. 12 These actions were supported by London officials. 
This support of the Central American Federation by Britain after 1838 
was in keeping with the British policy of gaining favorable trade 
concessions. There was little indication that Chatfield had a preference 
for a republic over any other form of government in Central America. 13 
He had little respect for Central Americans on the whole. Chatfield's main 
interest was in keeping a central goverrunent of some sort out of a 
consideration for earlier treaties. He had an apparent distaste for having 
to contend with five separate nations because of the greater uncertainty 
inherent in new negotiations. 
Later, in November of 1840, Chatfield brought his proposal for 
British control over the Mosquito Shore to London and the Foreign Office 
once again. This time he included the small port of san Juan del Norte 
within the protectorate boundaries. Tha t port had not been a part of the 
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earlier claim Chatfield had protxJsed three years earlier. However I 
because the Foreign Office was concerned over any loss of concessions ln 
Nicaragua, his plan was greeted wannly. Chatfield was suptxJrted by the 
Foreign Office in his efforts to secure the Mosquito Shore for England. 14 
That suptxJrt did not extent beyond the Foreign Office. By Febuary of 
1841, Chatfield's new plans had been veto=d and a M::>squito Protectorate 
was considered defunct by officials in London. Chatfield and the other 
British agents in Central America did not agree and acted on their own to 
gain a protectorate. They forced the issue. Ono= again, Chatfield declared 
the fonnation of a Mosquito Protectorate. It was a declaration of fact 
rather than intent, as it had been in 1837. In August of 1841, a force of 
British troops sailed into San Juan del Norte, took the local Nicaraguan 
commander hostage, and then made the claim. 15 
Apart from his blatant disregard of Foreign Office directives and his 
obvious belligerence in declaring a protectorate over Nicaraguan 
territory, there is the question of why Chatfield would continue to risk 
both his career and a war for a small bit of swampy ground for so many 
years. The answer lies in the gecgraphy of the region. The small PJrt of 
San Juan del Norte is a natural gateway to a canal through the isthmus at 
Nicaragua. It is also connects the only water route bet~en the coffee 
growing highlands of Costa Rica and the Atlantic. A country holding this 
port could both control the flow of coffee out of Costa Rica and influence 
any canal. The financial scope of tariff controls over coffee crops alone 
would have teen in the thousands of txJunds Sterling per year in the 
1840's. Canal rights, even tefore the gold discoveries of 1848 in 
california, would have increased this value many tines over. Nicaragua 
would have received a valuable source of incorre fran coffee tariffs and 
canal rights. English rrerchants would have saved the expense of paying 
11 • 
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Nicaraguan tariffs for shipping coffee through the port and profited from 
controlling the entrance to a canal. There was money to be saved and made 
in this small port. Chatfield was in a position to see this best. 
While Chatfield was farsighted enough to see the value of a 
protectorate over Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore and Mosquito Indians, his 
perspective was still not appreciated outside of London's Foreign Office 
in 1841. English officials could see little benefit from controlling 
swampy countryside and a small port along the Nicaraguan coast. Despite 
the issue of Nicaraguan control of tariffs over coffee shiprrents, it was 
not until 1844 that the British government issued an official declaration 
of a protectorate. 16 Even then, it appears that only personal 
intervention by the man who led the 1841 landing at San Juan del Norte, a 
Colonel MacCOnald, Superindendent of Belize, convinced London officials of 
such a C()lT['[l}. trnent. 
Whatever argurrents finally converted English intransigence are not 
included in published sources. Without any documentation, the best 
deduction from the timing of the declaration is that approval for the 
protectorate was tied with British reactions to an increased animosity 
between Central America and England. 
While officials in London were ploddingly slow to react to MacCOnald 
and Chatfield's protectorate, Central American reaction to the occupation 
in 1841 had been swift. McDonald's occupation both sparked renewed 
interest in the old federal republic and intensified anglophobia on the 
part of native Central Americans. There was a general deterioration of 
Chatfield's influence in the region. Ehglishmen v.ere threatened and 
Chatfield was afraid for his life. 17 Although there were no British 
lives lost, their property was destroyed in several cases. 
12. 
In response to this Central .American reaction, Chatfield became more 
forceful in his dealings. He returned threats of his cwn and blockaded 
Central American ports to quiet the regional anglophobia. It was a get­
tough policy. British corrrrercial interests w=re being affected and 
Chatfield needed stern rreasures to protect British merchant profits. 
Foreign Office support for Chatfield, in the face of this Central Arrerican 
intransigence, increased. wndon was rrore willing to give official 
approval to its Central Arrerican consul. It was in this envirorunent of 
Central .American hostility and declining British commerce within the 
region that the Mosquito Protectorate was declared. 
It cannot be said that English officials, on the whole, were overly 
interested in territorial expansion in Central Arrerica at the expense of 
sovereign states. If that had been the case, Chatfield's desire for 
official pronouncement of the Mosquito Protectorate would not have been 
frustrated for seven years. The protectorate would have been officially 
declared in 1837, if England had been interested in having control over 
the Mosquito Shore. Even after MacCOnald attempted to force the issue in 
1841, three years passed tefore Parliarrent acted. MacCOnald had to force 
the issue in wndon as well. Parliament reacted only after British 
concessions and lives w=re telieved to be in considerable jeopardy. Toot 
variance between local agent desires and the interests of a rrore 
conservative wndon bureaucracy could only have teen overcome by an 
argument of sorre rrerit. Whatever rationalization finally changed the 
official position can only be a matter of speculation. 
The declaration of a protectorate was one of several official British 
actions in Nicaragua that year. In response to several claims against 
Nicaragua for the destruction of British property, resulting from 
Nicaraguan protests, the Royal Navy blockaded Nicaraguan r:orts to force 
13. 
restitution. The resulting suspension of trade through those ports meant 
no customshouse revenue for the Nicaraguan government and an end to all 
exports and imports. Without a ready outlet to the sea, Nicaraguan 
pralucts piled up on the wharves. Nicaraguan businessmen lost rroney. The 
Nicaraguan government lost money. It was not lmg before those businessmen 
and government officials came to Chatfield's desk to agree on paYment of 
the claims. 
The terms v.Jere harsh. 'TWo English merchants, originators of the 
claims, gained Nicaraguan tobacco custans revenue for two years. In 
return, the Royal Navy lifted the blockade and trade resumed. The 
Nicaraguan government, tied to trade for its revenue, could only acquiesce 
to this pov.Jerful diplanacy. 
Between 1844 and 1848 there was considerable manuevering between the 
several governments of Central Arrerica over various portions of the 
Mosquito Shore. Interest was especially strong for the port of San Juan 
del Norte. The value of that small port soon became clear throughout the 
region. The New Granadians and North Americans entered these disputes with 
intrigues of their o.vn. The forner announced a claim to the southern bank 
of the San Juan river and the latter signed a treaty with New Granada 
supporting their claim in return for Panamanian transit right-of-ways In 
1846. 18 
The Nicaraguans were also encroaching on the protectorate. They 
established a government outpost in the town in 1847. Control and 
protection of the Mosquito Shore was becaning more corrplex. Chatfield 
encouraged the Foreign Office to take firm action to guarantee English 
control over this port. 
That action carre in January 1848. England declared San Juan del 
14.
 
Norte and roth banks of the San Juan river to be part of the Mosquito 
kingdom and also under British protection. To reinforce that claim, a 
canbined force of Englishrren and Mosquito Irrlians chased out the 
Nicaraguans and occupied the town. The Ehgl ish renarred the port and 
announced a new tariff schedule. 19 English troops were to quell the 
bickering over Chatfield's protectorate once and for all. 
Local Nicaraguan forces were not easily convinced and 
counterattacked. They forced the ~squito Indians into the surrounding 
jungle and captured the British commander. It was only a brief victory. 
New British troops attacked in force a few days later. They ~e 
successful in pushing the Nicaraguans inland, along the San Juan River, to 
the shores of Lake Nicaragua. It was there that the Nicaraguan president, 
Francisco castellon, agreed to recognize English control over the Mosquito 
Shore. That truce, signed in M=nch 1848, recognized "the undisputed 
occupation of the mouth of the San Juan." 20 The British were not to be 
denied. Nicaragua had admitted defeat. 
Beyond an abuse of Nicaraguan sovereignty, the Eng lish action was 
taken as an insult to the United States and their Monroe I):)ctrine. Papers 
in New York reported the warfare. Soon British actions along the San Juan 
River V>'2re on front pages of newspapers throughout the eastern ccast of 
the U.S. New York papers even mentioned Nicaraguan canal plans within 
their stories. 21 Fran these rernrts of English warfare in Central 
Jlmerica, the concept of building a canal through the middle of Nicaragua 
apparently became fairly cornron kncwledge among the literate U.S. public 
during the summer of 1848. 
Official U.S. reaction, in response to English aggression, was silence, 
but a State Department special agent was sent down to take a look around. 
This man, Elijah Hise, arrived in November 1848. Along with his private 
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instructions, Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State, officially 
instructed him to "further the cause of unionism" in the region and to 
negotiate treaties. 22 Hise vvas greeted warmly by all of the five 
differing countries, but esr:ecially so by Nicaragua. He vvas soon 
attempting to fulfill his instructions from his base in Guatamala City. 
Hise did little to restore the old republic, but did negotiate treaties. 
The following SUlTIT'er, Hise, nearing the end of his mission, 
negotiated a treaty that exoeeded his authorization. In June 1849, he 
negotiated what was to become known as the Hise-Selva Convention. It was 
an agreement to have Nicaragua become a protectorate of the United States. 
As a part of the convention, Nicaragua was also to give control over any 
future canal project to U.S. interests. It was a secret treaty. 23 Both 
signatories wanted to keep knowledge of the treaty from Chatfield. 
This treaty was possible because of intense interest in the central 
American isthmus after 1848. With the discovery of gold in California that 
year, passage to the california territory became a top priority with 
novice miners. Various U.S. shipping ccnpanies saw the profitability of 
ferrying those miners-to-be and expanded their or:erations tov.ard central 
America. Soon routes across the isthmus became cro.....ued with M1ericans 
anxious to get west. 
Despite the fact that Hise negotiated such a treaty and took it back 
to the United States without any sr:ecific mandate, his accepting the 
negotiations at all indicates the interest that gold discoveries in 
california had generated. Hise was apparently reacting to this interest. 
The treaty itself reflected the accepted view of Hise's lack of fiat 
from Washington. Hise negotiated an agreerrent that WJuld have placed the 
United States directly against English diplomatic interests over an issue 
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about which the British were rather sensitive. Rise was acting in such a 
peculiar rranner by negotiating a document with the potential to involve 
the U.S. and England in hostilities, that any instruction on this matter 
v..Duld have to have teen quite specific. There is no record of any such 
instruction. 
Another interesting aspect of the Hise-Sel va Convention was how Hise 
acted after he left Guatamala City with his agreement. As he was carrying 
his secret treaty back to Washington, Hise apparently sho~d the paper to 
Frederick Chatfield's personal secretary, Charles Booth. The two ~re 
traveling together and Booth knew of the contents of the treaty, reporting 
the same by letter to Chatfield, tefore he and Rise had left Central 
America. Booth may have secreted a look at the document, but there is no 
indication in his letter that he used any devious means to see the 
papers. 24 It is probable, then, that Rise let him see the treaty. 
Just as Hise was beginning his journey to the United States via the 
British colony of Belize, E. George Squire, his replacement, landed at San 
Juan del Norte. 25 Since the two did not record any rreeting, it v..Duld be 
safe to say that Elijah Hise was probably unaware of Squire's arrival. 
There is nothing in State Depart:rrEnt dispatches that indicates that Hise 
even knew who his replacement was. 
Squire's reason for landing in Nicaragua partly vindicates Hise and 
his peculiar negotiations of the few days preceding Squire's arrival. 
Squire's State Department instructions explicitly stated that he was to 
assist in negotiations to obtain canal rights for the Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship canal Ccrnpany. 26 This part of his instructions vindicates Rise for 
his canal clause. However, United States assumption of any sort of a 
protectorate over Nicaragua, as agreed to by Hise, was expressly 
forbidden by Squire's instructions. Squire was cautioned to make sure that 
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no U.S. government guarantees were associated with any concessions 
negotiated for that crnpany. 27 That insured that the Hise-selva 
Convention would be rejected by officials in Washington. It was. 
W1y Squire was instructed to assist that particular canpany while 
assuring no official U.S. guarantees with any concesssion is not explained 
in any known source on this period in Central America. Squire, himself, is 
rather vague on any explanations for his instructions. Whatever rationale 
existed behind those instructions at the time is apparently lost. All that 
is known is that Squire was instructed to assist the Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship Canal Co. in obtaining canal rights. 
Squire followed his instructions. He negotiated a concession for the 
Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Co. while keeping the United States out of 
any concession agreement. This canal concession was signed on August 27, 
1849. 28 Squire later negotiated a general treaty covering U.S.-Nicaraguan 
trade, dated in September of that year. 
'Ihe canpany Squire gathered concessions for that year was one founded 
In New York City under the direction of a rran named Cornelius Vanderbilt. 
Vanderbilt was an up-and-coming shipping magnate anxious to break into the 
California-bound trade. His interest in Nicaragua stemned from coming up:m 
the scene behind two rivals named Aspinwall and Law. These two controlled 
the overland route through Panana. Vanderbilt was forced to look elsewhere 
for a cross-isthmus route to california or compete against these men 
directly. SUch competition was impractical without large amounts of 
capital and ships. Vanderbilt did not have either. This led him to 
consider the next possible route across the isthmus, Nicaragua. 
Since this was his first project outside of the New York area, it 
seems natural that Vanderbilt would turn to the State Department for help 
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with negotiations with Nicaragua. It was also reasonable for that 
department to respond to his request. Apparently Vanderbi 1t simp1y asked 
and the State Department agreed. Squire's instructions were the answer to 
Vanderbilt's request for help. They W2re also a firm carnnitment to rerrain 
aloof from Vanderbilt's caTllTercial concession from Nicaragua. 
Wlile there was no fonnal U.S. endorsement of that concession, State 
Department help was crucial to the prarotion of the canal company in New 
York. Without an agreerrent from Nicaragua granting a right-of-way through 
its territory -- i.e. an agreement with Nicaragua and the u.S. as 
signatories -- such a canal project would have been unfeasible. Vanderbilt 
needed the concession before arranging any financing for his project. He 
became the first to benefit from Squire's negotiations. 
E. George Squire sailed to Central America with the task of praroting 
AIrerican corrrrercial interests. His instructions were centered on this 
point. He even landed in Nicaragua, rather than going to the diploma.tic 
capi tal, Guatarnala City. He was picking up where George Holdship had left 
off twelve years earlier. He was also heading into a confrontation with 
the sane British Consul Holdship had aggravated in 1837. Frederick 
Chatfield was still British Consul. He saw his fears of u.S. intervention 
in Central AIrerica finally come to fruition in E. George Squire. He rose 
to meet the challenge. 
Squire's canal concession with Nicaragua was onl y the first volley in 
this diplomatic battlefield. A larger battle soon developed over 
Chatfield's occupation of Tigre Island, in the Gulf of Fonseca, in O::::torer 
of 1849. This island sat astride the shipping routes into the only natural 
outlet for a canal on the western coast of Nicaragua. Chatfield had 
apparently been planning to sea 1 up roth possibl e entry fXJints to any 
future canal through Nicaragua after finding out arout the Hise-Sel va 
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convention. He made this move just as Squire was concluding negotiations 
with Honduras concerning transfer of the island to the U.s. for eighteen 
months. 29 That made Chatfield's occupation a violation of U.S. 
sovereignty 
The timing of Squire's agreement with Honduras and Chatf ield ' s 
occupation of the island ~re connected. Squire was attempting to block 
the occupation by a transfer of the island. He had notified Washington in 
mid-September about Chatfield's plans. 30 Then, within a month, he 
negotiated an agreement that ran counter to his instructions over 
involving the United States government with concessions. Squire was not 
to acquire territory. His doing so without any official mandate, in less 
time than it would take for two-way mail service, suggests strongly that 
this was an attempt to cotIDter Chatf ield. 
That gamble was a success. The :English consul's nove became the 
catalyst for another explosion of anglophobia in the Americas. Central 
Arrerican papers ~re virulent in their attacks. The New York papers joined 
in with a few personal broadsides against Chatfield. Washington responded 
to this journalistic call to action with an expression of public outrage 
and derrands for both evacuation and afX)logy. 31 
Chatfield was publicly hurrriliated, but did not lose Foreign Office 
supfX)rt. Britain evacuated, but without afX)logy. This reaction kept 
Nicaraguan intrigues in the New York papers and anti-British feelings ln 
the U.S. at a fever pitch. The annual presidential message to Congress ln 
March of 1850, in the midst of violent argurrents over the "Canpranise of 
1850" legislation, reflected this attitude. Despite the fact that the 
country was close to civil war at this fX)int, anglc:phobia and Central 
American issues still were important enough to bear mention in a divided 
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Congress. President Taylor was critical of British actions. He also 
presented the Hise and Squire agreerrents to Congress as a part of his 
yearly message. 32 
While these publ ic acts mirrored newspaper call s to action, closed­
door negotiations in Washington reflected a more pragrratic approach by the 
Taylor Administration. Even while the President appeared to be caught up 
with popular protests, quiet negotiations were continuing with England. It 
was during the height of anti-British feeling that negotiations for what 
later became known as the Clayton-.&11wer Treaty were being conducted In 
washington. 
The administration's vocal support of popular resentment was not much 
rrore than a facade. Despite hostile verbiage, there was never any rrention 
of Squire's intelligence of Chatfield's 'Tigre Island plans or Hise and 
Squire's agreements signed with Nicaragua. Those two docurrents were not 
released until after this new treaty had been completed on April 19, 
1850. 33 Squire's intelligence was apParently never officially released. 
The basic tenents of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty guaranteed neutrality 
of Nicaraguan ports, free-trade out of those ports and imposed certain 
limits upon any further territorial expansion by both the British and 
North Arrericans in Central Arrerica. The canal issue was settled between 
the U.S. and England by allowing equal access by all parties to any future 
canal. It was tasically a gentlemen's agreement not to interfere with each 
other in the region. It also implied official British approval for U.S. 
entry into Central America. It was an attempt to avoid future hostilities 
by settl ing the potential sources of conflict. 
Unfortunately, the treaty was Op2n to varied interpretation over the 
terri torial expansion clauses due to vague wording on that point. ~ch 
signatory, in fact, developed a different interpretation of the English 
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position because of this wording. England adopted the position that they 
could keep all territory controlled when the treaty \.\laS signed. The u.s. 
vlew \.\laS that England would renounce all clalins, including the Mosquito 
Protectorate. This issue \'.QuId becane a thorny topic in future disputes, 
when England v..Duld refuse to abandon possession of their Mosquito 
Protectorate. 
Despite the varied interpretation of those clauses, the treaty \.\laS 
hailed as a significant achievement by the u.s. It \.\laS ratified shortly 
after being delivered to Congress. Both the Hise-Selva Convention and 
Squire's general trade treaty were quietly dropped. Copies of Clayton­
Bulwer were forwarded to the consuls in central America. Both the 
British and American consuls were now obligated to fulfill the agreement. 
However, this larger peace between their countries did little to alleviate 
a feud then transpiring between the tv..D. Chatfield and Squire 'M2re locked 
too deeply in political mudslinging to be stopped by a treaty. 
These tv..D had been bickering ever since Squire's arrival In 
Nicaragua. The longer Squire stayed in Central America, the more Chatfield 
wanted his recall. Part of Chatfield's desire \.\laS linked to Squire's 
interference with Tigre Island, but there was also the Central Americans' 
use of Squire as a foil of British aims. 9:1uire had found his every move 
becc::.ming an irritant to Chatf ield. Newspapers in the region played up the 
rivalry. 
Each felt that the other would have to go. They requested the sarre 
from their respective goverrunents. Finally, by joint agreement, Squire was 
relieved in return for Chatfield's dismissal. It was an equitable 
agreement, living up to the spirit of the treaty. At least, it was, until 
London changed positions and left Chatfield in Guatamala City. 
This did not receive much publicity in U.S. newspapers. While u.s. 
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negotiators must have been upset over this British refusal to maintain the 
terms of an agreerrent, there is no indication of any such attitude at the 
time. Squire was recalled without camrent. Chatfield ranained without 
protest. 
While these two consuls were jousting in Central American newspapers 
and their resPective bosses were negotiating possible solutions to their 
quarrelsome agents in Washington, Vanderbilt was busy promoting a canal in 
New York. The Nicaraguan concession and Clayton-B.1lwer provided the means 
to overcome the hurdles of British control of San Juan del Norte and 
official guarantees for the canal. Speculators flocked to invest in canal 
bonds offered on the New York Stock Exchange. 
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II. 
CORNELIUS VANDERBILT AND THE ACX::ESSARY TRANSIT Ca1PANY 
It was during the sumrrer of 1850 that Vanderbilt rrade a highly 
publicized trip to England to gather British capital. He and his ~oerican 
investors were enthusiastic about the scheme and expected quick results. 
However, English money was more conservative, and, therefore, the canal 
plans suffered a setback. English bankers were interested, but they wanted 
to see cost surveys first. These ~re not available. The canal financing 
was then set aside until a survey, then in progress, could be finished. 34 
Vanderbilt returned to New York and then quietly left again. This 
time he went to Nicaragua. The public reason, published in the New York 
pap:=rs, was the need for Vanderbi 1t to solve some engineer ing problems 
firsthand. The private reason was that he wanted to alter his Nicaraguan 
concession. In addition to handling sane affairs on the river, vanderbilt 
negotiated for the transport of passengers and freight across the isthmus 
while building his canal. The Nicaraguans ~re reasonable. By the time he 
returned to New York, in April of 1851, Vanderbilt had altered the 
original charter to allow transport of passengers and cargo over the canal 
route while building a canal. 35 
Vanderbilt's trip to Central America over the winter of 1850-51 came 
at a time when Squire had left Nicaragua and his replacement had not yet 
been appointed. 36 This absence of an American consul leaves the period 
from October 1850 to April 1851 devoid of American dispatches from Central 
America. Official ~nerican information about Vanderbilt's trip does not 
exist. The only source of information was Vanderbilt himself. 
Since there was no such gap in English dispatches, it should be a 
simple expedient to read that intelligence. Ho~ver, in his A 
Palmerstonian Diplorrat in Central America, Mario Rodriquez, relying mostly 
on British docu:rrents, has Vanderbilt arriving in Nicaragua, for the first 
time, the following st.mrrer. 37 This emission of Vanderbilt's trip is 
surprising. He would normally have been considered a very imIUrtant 
person, his presence in Nicaragua should have been the subject of 
Chatfield's interest. The lack of this interest indicates the only obvious 
answer. Chatfield, in Guatarrala City, was ignorant of the trip. 
This lack of infornBtion lends more support to Vanderbilt's being 
involved in quiet negotiations with the Nicaraguans than just solving 
engineering difficulties, as a biography of the man suggests. 38 It also 
raises questions about the London trip and whether Vanderbi 1t was aware of 
more than just British hesitation over canal financing. The lack of 
British interest in financing any canal project \,<,Duld have been important 
intelligence that Vanderbilt would have wanted to keep quiet. His 
financial future hung in the balance. 
Vanderbilt \,<,Duld have been unable to ccrnplete his canal scherre 
without financing from British banks. Without that money, the canpany 
would be ruined. If Vanderbilt had known this beforehand, his trip to 
Nicaragua to secure the transit of passengers via an overland route was 
more an intense effort to salvage his idea of a cross-isthmus transit than 
an atterrpt to deal with engineering problems. If Vanderbilt had really 
gone to Nicaragua to solve a few problems with the logistics of his 
venture, there \,<,Duld have been news of the trip in either newspapers or 
Chatf ield"s dispatches. The lack of such infornBtion points to 
Vanderbilt's knowledge of British refusal to finance the canal over a year 
before that information became public. It points to a frantic effort to 
salvage his concession and company. 
After Varrlerbilt had arranged for his new charter and set up the 
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means for getting passengers across the isthmus, there was no apparent 
need for a canal scheme. However, canal plans VJere kept alive until after 
British hesitation became a refusal on their part to finance any canal 
without equal, prior Arrerican financing. That requirerrent was apparently 
beyond the financial scope of u.s. capitalists. This refusal became known 
ln the surmer of 1852, when a carnnission, without Vanderbilt, sent to 
gather British capital, came up empty handed. Speculators, who had 
inflated the Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Co. bond issue from $800 a 
share to $3,600 a share, VJere left out in the cold when the bottom fell 
out of those canal bonds shortly afterward. 39 
These bonds VJere only a sidelight to Vanderbilt and his principal 
investors by that surnrrer. The canal scheme had taken a back seat to the 
newer Accessary Transit Company. That company was born of the new 
concesslon, signed in April of 1851. Vanderbilt had cpened the doors of 
his new company and began selling tickets for a cross-isthmian 
transp::>rtation service within three months. 40 A route was f inall y ofBn 
after over a year and a half of traveling, promoting, and negotiating. 
Vanderbilt was ready to pull in the profits, but first he had to share 
some of those profits with his investors. This involved investors or 
governments in three different countries. Fach had been promised sorrething 
in return for their help or, in the case of the British, non­
interference. 
The Nicaraguans had been pranised a share of the prof its. By the 
terms of the transit charter signed in April 1851, the government of 
Nicaragua was to receive a yearly payrrent of $10,000, plus 10 percent of 
net profits. 41 There VJere additional clauses involving stock options 
and eventual acquisition of the route after a period of time, but these 
were never exercised. Thus the only important terms became the $10,000 
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yearly payment and the 10 percent profit sharing agreement. 
New York investors were offered a variable portion of 192 original 
shares at a selling price of $2,000 per share. Then, once the doors were 
opened for business, those shares were split 200 to 1 and offered on the 
New York Stock Exchange at $20 per share. 42 With a little 
multiplication, it is easy to see that from their intial investment that 
each individual brought in on the ground floor of the company realized a 
100 percent return before a ship had even set sail. 
The official British position, from Clayton-Bu lwer , was to allow free 
trade through the port of San Juan del Norte. But, local British agents 
were not so accx>ITIDodating. Used to acting independently and dragging a 
reluctant Foreign Office behind them, these rren soon brought atout the 
first test of the treaty. This first violation of Clayton-Bulwer becarre 
known as the Prometheus Affair. Prorretheus was the ship involved in the 
incident. It was on this ship that local British agents denied Arrericans 
free access to the port of san Juan del Norte. 
In the fall of 1851, harbor officials at San Juan del Norte attempted 
to collect harbor dues from the captain of that Accessary Transit Co. 
ship. Vanderbilt, who happened to be aboard on another inspection visit, 
refused to pay. The Prc:rnetheus was then brought under warning shots f rom a 
Royal Navy ship in the harbor. The Americans paid under protest. 
Q1ce Vanderbilt arrived back in the U.S., his protest was joined by 
the newspapers. They demanded satisfaction. 43 It was a replay of the 
Tigre Island Incident of 1849, only this time of greater intensity. 
Because of the direct violation of Clayton-Bulwer, the government position 
became both vocal and substantial. The American President demanded relief. 
He dispatched ships to san Juan del Norte to prove his resolve. There was 
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a threat of war. 
This saber-rattling got quick attention from officials in London. 
These rren, vrctnting to uphold the terms of the earlier treaty, did not 
ans~r the American challenge with guns. They, to the considerable ire of 
Chatfield, apologized and guaranteed free access. 44 Clayton-BulVoBr was 
honored. Chatfield was embarrassed once again. 
The Prorretheus Affair was another example of local British officials 
attempting to force England into supporting their agents after the fact. 
These agents hoped to repeat their past successes in Nicaragua with the 
Pranetheus Affair. It did not work. England rejected the claims of their 
local agents and supported the treaty. 
The Prometheus Affair and official reaction to the treaty violation 
offers a glimpse of the jockeying for position and profit by the four 
different antagonists. All the differing groups had specific interests at 
stake in the small fOrt tha t November. For the two governrrents, the 
violation of the treaty was more important as a violation of a principle. 
American officials could not allow the violation to go uncontested as a 
point of honor. The English, on the other hand, were clearly in the wrong 
and could not justify the affair without jeoPardizing future relations 
with the U.S. For Chatfield, the incident offered the opportunity to drag 
his governrrent into defending its agents in Central Arrerica over a p:::>int 
of honor. He hoPed to erase American gains in Nicaragua provided by the 
treaty. For Vanderbilt, it vrctS an illegal expense effecting his 
operations. The dispute over hartor dues was only th~ visable portion of 
sane British group's interest in ruining Clayton-BulVoBr and closing the 
transit. Who they were is not available in published sources. 
This test of Clayton-Bulwer vrctS another victory for the U. S. in 
Central America. This time it was at the expense of local Ehglish agents. 
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The terms of the treaty governing neutrality and free-trade were 
reaffirrred. u.s. resolve, measured by its willingness to call out the Navy 
over violations, was proven. British officials were willing to backp:rlal 
in Central America. That region was not worth the expense of a war. 
American interests were secure for the moment. 
Passenger and cargo traffic grew from a trickle to a flood after the 
dispute had been settled. Soon, every ship fran the east was crov.u.ed with 
people heading to California and every ship from San Francisco was packed 
with gold on its way to New York. While exact figures are unavailable now, 
estirrates of passenger traffic for that year from various sources munber 
as high as 2,000 a month. Gold shipments were in the millions of dollars. 
The Nicaraguan route was popular because it was two days faster, the fares 
were cheaper and the clirrate was healthier than the rival Panarranian 
route. Vanderbilt and the other directors quickly realized a healthy 
return for their efforts. 
In June of 1852, the Accessary Transit Co. declared its first 
dividend. The directors paid out $2 per share on reported gross earnings 
of $400,000. This added up to a net profit ratio of about 20 percent or 
$76,000 for the first year of operations. 45 
The Nicaraguans should have received $7,600 as their portion of the 
prof its, but the canpany refused to pay. The directors claimed there 
were no profits. This was a blatant breach of contract on the canpany's 
part. The Nicaraguan government attempted to gain respite in the courts. 
It filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of New York City. That 
action failed over the question of U.S. jurisdiction over Nicaraguan 
companies. 46 
The company claim of no profits and questions of u.S. court 
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jurisdiction were possible because the Accessary Transit Co. was managed 
as a separate Nicaraguan canpany by the directors. It was separate from 
the shipping lines that connected the transit with the U.S. The directors 
claimed that it was a Nicaraguan canpany and, therefore, beyond U.S. 
jurisdiction. At the sane time, these directors kept all the corrpany 
accounts in New York. 
The question of jurisdiction by a U.S. court was raised by Accessary 
Transit Co. lawyers. Their argurrent was accepted and the subsequent ruling 
was that no such lawsuit could be raised in New York. The judge based his 
decision on the premise that the Accessary Transit Co. was an enterprise 
located wholly within the State of Nicaragua and that any contract 
disputes could only be raised within that state. 47 
This must have been a profound disaPr:ointment to the Nicaraguans. 
They ~re being cheated. To have their case thrONI1 out of court on a 
technicality was certainly a blow. But they were caught up in the peculiar 
situation of being contracted with an American owned company conducting 
all of its business within a foreign country. There was no violation of 
law in New York. Therefore, there was no jurisdiction over the matter by 
courts in that city. 
The court's legal justification for refusal to rule was valid. The 
canpany was not operating in the U.S. and had not violated any U.S. law. 
There were two clear options open to the Nicaraguan government. These were 
to either press the case in Nicaraguan courts, where no Arrerican <,o,Duld 
have willingly gone, or use the breach of contract as an excuse to revoke 
the charter and close the route. They did neither. 
Why the Nicaraguans did not shut down the route can only be a matter 
of conjecture now. The canpany had set a precedent of refusing to honor 
the contract in part and might have been encouraged into additional 
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refusals by a passive attitude. The time to have made rrore of an issue of 
the rratter would have been in the surmer of 1852. The Nicaraguans should 
have attempted more than just the suit in New York. Their lack of action 
is a mystery. 
Vanderbilt. undoubtedly saw the possiblities resulting from 
embarrassing the Nicaraguans in the New York courts. His charter was in 
jeopardy. He apparently decided that the time was ripe to garner whatever 
profits he could and leave the transit to rrore reckless investors. He 
found the other directors eager to buy him out. By the end of 1852, he had 
sold his interest in the Accessary Transit Co. He left the management of 
the company to the other directors. 
This rrove by Vanderbilt was obviously grounded in a belief that the 
Nicaraguan government would attempt a takeover of the Accessary Transit 
Co. 0ferations over breach of contract. With all reasonable legal action 
circumvented by the simple exped.ient of keeping the account books in New 
York, the Nicaraguans certainly could have been expected to take sorre 
action to force payment. The transit route obviously seened to be 
survlvlng by a thin thread that surmer. Vanderbilt undoubtedly did not 
like the possibilities and took the prudent course of leaving. 
What rationale the other directors had in taking control of the 
comp3.ny at that time can only be a rratter of speculation now. There are no 
surviving records of the comp3.ny to refer to toda,y. Base::l upon vma t is 
kno.-m of the event, the rrost realistic inference is that the other 
directors forced the issue of payment to the Nicaraguans to bring about 
the trial and Vanderbilt's ba.ilout. They fooled Vanderbilt into believing 
the concession was about to be revoked. 
The key to such a scheme, if this was the case, would have been a 
quiet payn1ent of the required $7,600 to Nicaraguan officials to keep the 
31 • 
quiet payment of the required $7,600 to Nicaraguan officials to keep the 
route oPen. If Vanderbilt had no knowledge of such a payment, he could 
have been eXPeCted to have been ITDre than happy to leave the carrpany to 
the other directors. This thesis fits later actions by those directors and 
explains their seemingly foolish investment in 1852. 
The cost of buying out Vanderbilt was impressive by today's standard 
and must have been astounding at the time. In a combination of cash and 
bonds, Vanderbilt received over $1,500,000. He also was to receive 22.5 
percent of the gross profits from being a general agent of the company_ 
This percentage ~uld have been worth at least $80,000 a year, based upon 
the first year's revenues alone. The buyout equaled 40 percent of the 
tota 1 worth of the canpany a t the tiIre. 48 
In 1ight of such outrageous sums of money exchanging hands to buyout 
Vanderbilt, it is almost unbelievable that these same directors ~uld have 
been concerned over a paltry $7600 payment to Nicaragua in June. Still, 
the extant literature indicates that trey did indeed do exactly that and 
that Vanderbilt took. his money and left shortly afterward. That ~uld 
indicate that the New York businessrren were taking advantage of the 
Nicaraguans. It discounts the possiblity of these same businessmen taking 
advantage of Vanderbilt. The conclusion that there was a scheme to cheat 
the Nicaraguans is supported by the individual bits of evidence available 
for research. 
At the same time, scholars have failed to view the sum of all this 
evidence. Realistically, the sum of the evidence points to corporate 
suicide. It would have the canpany killing the goose laying the golden 
eggs rather than taking the easier expedient of redocing the number of rren 
sharing that gold. In spite of earlier research, logic dictates that 
Vanderbi 1t was cheated and non-payment of the Nicaraguan share of the 
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profits was part of a scheme to trick Vanderbilt into leaving the company. 
This is likely because Vanderbilt was the easier target. Gambling on 
Vanderbilt's anger over being fooled did not hold the same risk as that 
of having Nicaraguan officials close the transit itself. The survival of 
the company was important to the new directors wanting to sit at 
Vanderbilt's desk. Fboling Vanderbilt would have been the best way to 
insure that reSUlt. 
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III.
 
CHAR'" ES M()W~AN AND THE ACCESSARY TRANSIT Ca1PANY
 
Charles Morgan was the man who replaced Vanderbilt as president of 
the Accessary Transit Co. He had been one of the original investors and, 
after Vanderbilt, the majority stockholder. Beyond that, he was a powerful 
shipping magnate in his own right. His investrrents extended from New York 
to the Gulf of Mexico. Fran his southern base of operations in New 
Orleans, Morgan held a near monopoly in coastal shipping within the 
gulf. 49 He had the financial position and knowledge to have succeeded at 
the rough and tumble shipping industry of the 1800's. 
After Morgan took control of the canpany in the spring of 1853, he 
began to renege on the buyout agreement with Vanderbilt. Since Vanderbilt 
was out of the country on a pleasure cruise, Morgan was left with a free 
hand. He wasted little tine. By that SUITTCTer, Morgan had removed every 
connection between the canpany and Vanderbilt. Publicly, he moved the 
canpany offices and took Vanderbilt's narre off of all advertising. 
Privately, in violation of the terms of Vanderbilt's buyout agreement, he 
refused to honor anything beyond the cash payment of $1,200,000. 50 'rhat 
explained his initial generosity. Morgan never intended to fulfill the 
terms of the Vanderbi 1t buyout. 
Morgan was a lmost guaranteed a 1awsui t upon Vanderbi 1t 's return. It 
would have been foolish for him to expect otherwise. It is hardly 
conceivable that Vanderbilt would have accepted loss of both money and 
prestige without a fight. It would also seem that Morgan was laying the 
groundwork for a defeat in the courts. Since he could not do all of his 
manipulating against Vanderbi 1t in secret, most of his actions ~re public 
knowledge at the time. They were followed in the New York pap:=rs, which 
all agreed that Morgan YJaS " looking for trouble" from Vanderbil t. 51 
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Seemingly oblivious to the certain outcare, Morgan worked to set up 
his new canpany. Along with the consolidation of his po~r in New York, 
Morgan needed a trusted man to control the San Francisco end of his 
operation. Such a rran would have to have been able to handle both rren and 
account books while making a profit. That man, Cornelius K. Garrison, was 
brought into the canpany shortly after Morgan took over. 52 
Cornelius Garrison was I iving in Panarra City when Morgan gave him the 
nod. That was his latest stop in a life which had spanned fourty-four 
years and several occupations. He had, at tirres, been a riverboat worker 
on the Hudson, an architect in Canada, a riverboat designer and operator 
along the Mississippi River and finally a banker in Panarra. His fortunes 
had risen and fallen with each rrove, but he was successful when he 
accepted the position in San Francisco. 53 
It is this connection in Panama which gives further plausibility to 
the hypothesis of Morgan tricking Vanderbilt into selling out in the fall 
of 1852. With a trusted banker in Panama having $7,600 of Morgan's In 
hand, it VJOuld have been possible for Morgan to have set up a situation 
where Vanderbilt might have believed the canpany to be on the verge of 
ruin and unload the majority of his ccrnlli.t:ment. 
This would have required Morgan's forcing a lawsuit over non-payment 
of the Nicaraguan share of the net profits and then to pay that share when 
the lawsuit was decided in court over jurisdictional questions. 'Ib an 
unsuspecting Vanderbilt, it might then appear inevitable that the charter 
would be revoked and his canpany go bankrupt. Morgan could then have 
played the greedy, yet foolish, investor and allowed Vanderbilt to dump a 
potentially worthless company before any word of a revocation became 
kno.-m. 
~5. 
This is, of course, complete speculation. There is no way of ever 
knowing what caused the Nicaraguans not to revoke their charter after 
losing the case or why other directors of the Accessary Transit Co. \>.Duld 
risk their very profitable company over $7,600. However, the sequence of 
events over the profit sharing, the buyout of Vanderbilt, and the windfall 
by Garrison several months later can be tied together by the possibility 
of Morgan arranging the lawsuit and then satisfying the Nicaraguan 
government witmut Vanderbilt's kno.vledge. It v.ould explain the two 
curious actions of the corrpany reneging on the profit sharing and 
Vanderbilt's willingness to leave after spending several years setting up 
the corrpany. 
The key elerrent in such a hypothesis is Garrison's having quietI y 
p:l.id off the Nicaraguans at the proper tine. It v.ould rrean tffit the tv.o, 
Morgan and Garrison, \>.Duld have to have been in confidence with each 
other. Garrison did have the opportunity to know Morgan before he was 
hired in 1853. Poth were active in shipping out of New Orleans. Garrison 
plied the river. Morgan's ships, under the direction of one of his sons, 
plied the gulf during those Sam? years. Garrison also traveled to New York 
in the surmer of 1852. The trip was to organize a branch to his banking 
interest in Panama. He may have knocked on Morgan's door while he was 
there. It v.ould have been reasonabl e for Garrison to have looked to Morgan 
as a possible investor in banking. Morgan was arrong a group of wealthy men 
who could have financed or encouraged investment in such a bank. Of 
course, any cormecting of the two nen prior to 1853 can only be 
speculation, but it \>.Duld lend sane credibility to a p:l.yoff which \>.Duld, 
ln turn, provide one rationale for Morgan hiring the almost unknown 
Garrison. 
Ho.vever, it is not speculation that Garrison recieved a heal thy 
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$60,000 a year to represent the Accessary Transit Co. in San Francisco. 54 
It was a considerable sum for the day. It would have been a very generous 
offer to a known individual, but especially so to some unknown banker from 
Panama. But Garrison was apParently worth every bit of the money. He 
entered San Francisco like a whirlwind in March 1853. 
In short order, Garrison had a firm grip on the Pacific OCean 
operations and the city. Newspaper accounts of the period indicate that 
the route was being mismanaged from the isthmus to san Francisco. 55 
Garrison soon had the route problems corrected. While settling the company 
problem, he even found time to run for mayor. He was elected to that 
office six months after he arriVed. 56 
The Nicaraguan portion of the operation, managed separately as the 
Accessary Transit Co., was equally as successful as the San Francsico 
agent those first months of Morgan's presidency. Pas sengers, cargo, and 
gold flo~d as quickly as ships could arrive at the Nicaraguan ports. 
However, in spite of healthy revenues, June of 1853 found the company 
without a dividend. Morgan claimed that despite the earnings, there ~re 
no profits. 57 He based his claims on the Vanderbilt buyout and high 
operating costs. 58 
This probably would have been the case if Morgan was, in fact, living 
up to the terms of the Vanderbil t agreement. He was not. Morgan was not 
being honest. He was arranging the books to avoid declaring profits. By 
publicly appearing to honor the Vanderbilt agreement, while not doing so, 
he created the illusion of having lost money. Without profits, there were 
no dividend payments or profit sharing with the Nicaraguans. This rreant 
that Morgan could have pocketed whatever net profit there might have been 
for hirrself. 
37. 
What Morgan did the summer of 1853 is really a matter of speculation. 
There are no financial records of any company transactions to research. 
However, since no monies were being paid out, there are only two possible 
explanations left. The first would be that Morgan's profit statEment of 
that year was true. This was unlikely because of the gross revenue and 
tvbrgan's failure to honor the Vanderbilt agreement. The second is that 
Morgan used the Vanderbilt debt as the basis for his depressed profits 
claims and pocketed the money. This is highly probable. Apparently there 
was a bit of larceny in Morgan. Without Vanderbilt in town to raise any 
protest, Morgan could spend all sumrrer juggling account books and cheating 
investors at will. However, with Vanderbilt's return, the ruse would be 
up. And it was. 
While Garrison was probably celebrating his election to the mayor's 
office in S:m Francisco, Vanderbilt was landing in New York. 59 He was 
returning to the long-expected settlEment with Morgan. The "trouble", 
predicted by the New York Herald earlier in the sumrrer, had arrived. 
Vanderbilt is reported to have written his rivals at the Accessary 
Transit Co. upon his return: Gentlerren: You have undertaken to cheat rre.II 
I won't sue you for the law is too slow. I'11 ruin you." 60 Whether or 
not he really said or wrote this (it is doubtful that he did), he did live 
up to the intent of that statement. Vanderbilt set out to ruin Morgan. 
He launched a two-fold attack, consisting of canpeting against 
Morgan in the shipping business and attempting to tie up the canpany in 
the courts. Vanderbi 1t canpeted with tvbrgan by opening a rival canpany, 
the Independent Opposition Line, within a month. He used his ships to 
start a three-way rate war against the operators of both the Panama and 
Nicaragua routes. 61 Quickly, the New York papers were speculating that 
Vanderbilt was operating at a loss and that the other shippers "W2re 
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suffering by also having to match the below cost rates. 62 
He assaulted the Accessary Transit Co. in the courts, despite his 
note to the contrary. This 1i tigation consisted of his 1aying claim to 
canpany stearrers and filing claims against his lost payrrents. 63 However, 
there is no record of his ever f il ing for the 22.5 percent of gross 
revenue granted him as a part of the original buyout. The absence of that 
claim is curious since, acoording to a financial statement fran Decerrber 
of 1853, a successful ruling would have brought in about $200,000. 64 
This aspect of Vanderbilt's loss was brought up in another court case but 
was never raised by Vanderbilt himself. 
Nicaragua was quiet about a lack of profits during the sumner and 
fall of 1853. It made no attempt to inquire into the curious dealings 
between the various directors. There was no incident to disrupt transit 
operations. The Nicaraguan government was apparently satisfied by the 
company's claims that year or were unaware of the possible cheating by 
Morgan. 
The tranquility of business relations was not reflected in the 
diplomatic relations between the two states during the same periexL On 
the diplomatic front, the two nations were quarreling over various 
actions by the Nicaraguan minister, Marcoleta. The U.S. State Department 
had asked for Marco1eta 's recall because he was said to have interfered 
with the internal affairs of the U.S. 65 This was based upon his having 
published the tenns of a treaty settling an issue between England and the 
United States concerning the Mosquito Shore l::€fore the Pierce 
administration had released that treaty to the U.S. Senate for 
ratification. It was considered an insult by Daniel Webster, the Secretary 
of State, and he forced the issue with Nicaragua. Although reluctant at 
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first, Nicaragua acceded to the dem:md and Marcoleta departed New York in 
the early spring of 1853. 
While the interest in having Marcoleta recalled was not officially 
related to the Accessary Transi t Co., there was a close proximity l:::etween 
the original request for recall and Nicaraguan legal action to recover 
their share of the first dividend in the swrmer of 1852. Daniel Webster's 
letter notifying the American minister in Nicaragua of the requested 
recall was dated September 1, 1852. 66 The original litigation by 
Nicaragua l:::egan in August of that year. Any connection would be 
speculation, but there is a possibil ty that the two events are related. 
Such an action by the State Deparbnent and Daniel Webster could be an 
indication of an interest in preventing Nicaragua from gaining potential 
legal support for claims against the canpany in New York. However, if 
there was such an interest on Webster's part, there is no evidence of it 
in any published source. Another possibility is that Webster may have 
owned an interest in the shipping canpany, but again there is nothing upon 
which to base such a conclusion. Despite the Nicaraguan minister's recall, 
that case was settled by a question of jurisdiction by U.S. courts. The 
lack of any substantive challenge to subsequent operations in Nicaragua 
causes further doubt that Marcoleta's recall was connected to any legal 
actions against the Accessary Transit Co .. 
Between Christmas 1853 and June of 1854, the three shipping 
canpanies continued their rate war. Vanderbilt kept his rates at a 
fraction of what the other two canpanies had been charging. They were 
forced to lower their rates to a canpetitive level. At the same time, 
Vanderbilt would dump large blocks of stock on the market to depress the 
Accessary Transit Co. stock value. That company should have been in dire 
straits, yet in June Morgan declared a $3 per share dividend. 67 
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This $3 dividend was payable on an estimated 78,400 shares of 
stock. 68 That figure is the sum of 38,400 original shares from 1851 and 
Vanderbilt's 40,000 shares from the fall 1852 buyout. These are the only 
publicly issued stock armounced through June 1854 and, by all sources 
consulted, can be realistically taken as the most likely number of shares 
available. This equals a declared net profit of $235,000. 
That dividend must have been a shock on Wall Street. It must have 
been even more of a surprise in Nicaragua. The Wall Street baron's 
astonishrrent must have been over the viability of Morgan's company in the 
face of cutthroat rate wars. The Nicaraguan government s concern was 
undoubtedly over the lack of a $23,500 deposit in their treasury. That 
v.Duld have been their share of the net profits, except that Morgan 
neglected to pay. 
Once again, Nicaraguan officials traveled to New York. <:nce aga1.n, 
they filed suit in the State of New York over lack of payrrent. 69 As in 
1852, the Nicaraguan commission met with little sympathy and no success in 
their attempt to secure payment of their claim. The Nicaraguans quietly 
returned to their country in defeat. The transit operations were not 
interrupted. 
A question of Morgan's rationale in neglecting to pay the Nicaraguan's 
their share of the profits is raised by that renewed legal action. There 
is no published explanation available. Logic would dictate that Nicaragua 
\\QuId have held the lucrative transit route hostage over the non-payrrent. 
The Nicaraguan goverrurent could have very easily occupied the transit and 
demanded payrrent. A reasonable businessmm \\QuId have been sensitive to 
such behavior and aspired to maintain a friendly relationship with the 
Nicaraguans instead of with the various investors. On the surface, at 
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least, this indicates a certain recklessness on Morgan's part. 
The Nicaraguans were presumably rational men. Their action and lack of 
action should have had a rational basis. Therefore, the lack of any 
punitive action by the Nicaraguans after the loss of the legal action that 
surnrer can best be explained by the logical assumption that an out-of­
court settlenent was rrade. This rests on the assurnption that Morgan v.Duld 
attenpt to withhold payrrent until the Nicaraguan government pressed the 
issue, then pay the required aITOunt with some sort of excuse. That sort of 
action by Morgan would fit with his earlier treatment of Vanderbilt ln 
their agreenent. It could also explain why the Nicaraguans v.Duld forego 
any further public action to gain their share of the profits. 
The men running the shipping companies to and from the isthmus were 
highly competitive and reckless, but they were not irrational either. The 
rate wars were filling the holds of their ships, but they were losing 
money. None of these men was willing to put up with that state of affairs 
for too long. So, the destructive canpetition carne to an end when the 
account books showed too great of a loss. en September 1, 1854, the 
shippers rrade a gentlemen's agreement to split up the traffic and buyout 
Vanderbilt again. It was a fairly simple arrangement. The two rival 
companies, holding operating charters, split the business between them and 
agreed to pay subsidies to the each other if one route received wore 
traffic than the other. Vanderbilt's ships were purchased and the 
Opposition Line closed. This time, Vanderbilt took all of his money in 
cash. 70 
The money trading hands was in the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
that september. Vanderbilt sold all of his ships for a nice profit. He 
also received $40,000 a month fran the Panama route carqJany for not 
competing against them. Morgan payed out $115,000 to Vanderbilt to settle 
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accounts. Morgan, in turn, received a similar arrount from his Panama rivals 
as a part of the passenger rebate plan. 71 The Panama route shippers did 
not receive any tangible benefit fran the plan. This marked a lull in the 
transit wars on Wall Street. 
Such was not the case in Central America. There, rivals were becoming 
more belligerent and events were taking place that could affect the 
profitable trade over the various routes. The Liberal/Conservative 
differences, always bubbling just beneath the surface, boiled over into 
warfare in Nicaragua early in 1854. In San Juan del Norte, a Mosquito 
Indian's death sparked a ccmic opera incident with a serious ending. In 
Panama, the railroad connecting the Atlantic and Pacific was nearlng 
ccmpletion. The recess in New York was soon giving way to Central Arrerican 
intrigues. 
The uneasy peace that Francisco Castellon, the Liberal Nicaraguan 
president, Ix>ught from England in 1848 had eroded the governrrent badly in 
the intervening four years. Liberal and Conservative differences, not 
settled by the break with the earlier republic, were exacerbated by the 
loss of the 1848 battles. The loss to England was viewed as a Liberal 
defeat and the Conservatives soon replaced Castellon with a Conservative 
president. When those sarre Conservatives attempted to remain in power by 
al tering the constitution, civil war broke out l:etween the Conservatives 
and the Liberals. 
The f ighting continued sp:::>radically, with no c lear victor, throughout 
the early part of 1854. The only outcome was a split into separate 
governments. Francisco Castellon became president over the Liberal 
section of the country. A Conservative renained president over the 
Conservative section. The nation known tcx3ay as Nicaragua was split into 
43.
 
thirds aITDng the Liberals, Conservatives, and Mosquito Indians. 
The Conservative faction was centered around the city of Granada, on 
the northern shore of Lake Nicaragua. It controlled all lands south of a 
vague line just north of that city. This included the transit route. It 
was considered the established government by foreign states. 
Farther to the northeast, centered aJx)Ut the city of Leon, was the 
Liberal faction. It was in control of most of northern Nicaragua. 
Considered rebels, its members did not have any foreign recognition. Their 
provisional government controlled only the lands they could hold by force. 
They had no connection with the transit squabbles. 
Because of the fractured governments in Nicaragua during 1854, it is 
easy to see that any question atout Accessary Transit Co. operations ~re 
solely within the purview of the Conservatives in Granada. The 
crnmissioners sent to file suit, approach the State Departrrent and 
otherwise deal with the U.S. were Conservatives. The Conservatives were 
the only ones dissatisfied with arrangerrents concerning the transit route. 
Any payrrents fran the canpany went into Conservative hands. They were in 
canplete control of the transit. 
Due to the ongoing civil war between Liberal am Conservative in 
Nicaragua, Morgan's attempt to forego payment of the Nicaraguan share and 
the Conservatives' attempts to gain that money canes into fcx:::us. From 
Morgan's perspective, the delinquent payment IT6y have been a calculated 
risk to test the wariness of the Conservatives while having to wage a war 
In their own country. The ans~ring lawsuit was a signal of Conservative 
insistence of Morgan's adherence to the terms of the contract. The 
subsequent peaceful settlement was proba.bly the result of an out-of-court 
settlement. Considering the Conservatives' need for hard cash to wage 
their civil war, it Vo.Uuld be doubtful that the Nicaraguans \.o.Guld have 
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willingly let the canpany refuse to pay. Such a refusal should have 
resulted in the occupation and ransaning of the transit. That the 
Conservatives did not do that leaves little rcxrn for explanations other 
than that of a settlement of some sort. 
Meanwhile, there was the Liberal faction in Leon. It had almost the 
same amount of power and land under its control as its Conservative 
rivals. However, the Liberals did not have any say in canpany affairs. 
Therefore, they did not receive any benefit from the transit after the 
civil war began. They suffered no insult from Morgan's intractabil ity. 
However, they must have realized the potential benefit of awning and 
controlling a transit route worth $33,000 per year. It would be a rlpe 
plum for their government. 
To the east, the Mosquito Shore was also becaning more volatile. The 
area was still considered a British protectorate, but the influence of 
British sea power faded as 1854 wore on. It was in that year that England 
became involved in a war against Russia in the Crirrea. 72 The stability 
in the port of San Juan del Norte weakened in direct pror:;ortion to the 
diminishing British presence. Hostility between local natives and North 
Americans, held in check by British influence, soon boiled over in the 
port. 
That emotion, coupled with a healthy dose of racism, resulted in the 
death of a Mosquito Indian during a braWl. 'l'he killer was a white rran. He 
was protected by other whites despite his crime. In quick succession, the 
American consul, the Accessary Transit Co. and, finally, the u.S. Navy 
became involved with the matter. The Mosquito Indians and Americans were 
on the verge of battle when a sort of peace was enforced by the U.S.S. 
Cyane. That ship simply banbarded san Juan del Norte on June 13, 1854 and 
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drove the indians into the jungle. 
This was a direct affront to the British. It was also the first 
signal of waning British influence in the region. A sllBll Royal Navy 
vessel in the harbor could only observe the destruction and protest the 
Arrerican action. 73 By the terms of the treaty granting the Mosquito 
Protectorate, England should have responded to the attack on Mosquito 
Indian lands. By the terms of Clayton-Bul~r, it was an insult to the 
British by the Americans. British outrage and action could have been 
expected over such a p:>int of honor at any other tine. But, this was not 
to be in 1854. The English were busy attacking the Russian Crirrea at the 
time. The Mosquito Protectorate had assuned a very low priority. The 
United States could operate with a free hand while England was occupied in 
Russia. 
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IV. 
WILLIAM WALKER AND HIS EXPEDITION 
It was in this atmosphere of gro-ving American influence, waning 
British influence, internal civil war and high potential profit that 1854 
ended and 1855 began. There was little threat of English action l.n 
Nicaragua after the surrrrer of 1854 because of the more pressing problem of 
the Crimean War. The U.S. government was free to fill in the void left by 
the English withdrawal, but internal strife was stifling official freedom 
of action. The U.S. was drifting into its own civil war, and sectional 
differences kept the Franklin Pierce administration busy balancing 
danestic affairs. Nicaragua was separated into two weak governments, 
neither of which really extended control much beyond the rival cities of 
Granada. and Leon. Nicaragua was in anarchy. The United States and England 
seerred unwilling or unable to extend more than a cursory influence. The 
time was ripe for individual initiative. 
Into this void came an enterprising Californian narred Byron Cole. He 
paid the Liberal goverrnuent a visit in August of 1854. He was openly 
welcorred. Whether offered a contract, as generally believed, or seeking 
one, Cole left Nicaragua with an agreement to have Americans enter 
Nicaragua on the Libera1 side in the war aga ins t the Conservatives. He 
took that contract to San Francisco and delivered it to a man named 
William Walker. 
William Walker was a filibuster. Filibuster was a word used to 
describe pirates and rrercenaries in the 1850's. These sort of men were the 
soldiers of fortune of their day, ready to live or die in other JreI1'S 
battles for a price. Walker was a member of a loose fraternity of such rren 
living in california during the Gold Rush days. 
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He was also an unusual individual. Walker was a highly educated m,m, 
trained in several careers. This rcm:mtic career of the sword was his 
fourth career in ten years. That, in itself, is not overly curious until 
one looks into those other careers and Walker's earlier life. 'l'hen the 
canplexities of this man become apparent. 
Walker was born in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1824, of a well-to-do 
family. This family was a ffi3.instay of the canmunity. His father, Janes, 
ONTled a dry-gc:x:rls store and an insurance canpany. He was successful in 
those businesses and was also active in the Church of Christ. The Walker's 
lived the stern, noral existence of dedicated followers of that religious 
sect. There was no drinking, smoking, gambling or s'M2aring allCM'ed at 
their large brick home. 74 
William was the first of four children born into that family. He was 
follo.ved by two younger brothers and a sister. Of the four, he became the 
best educated and achieved the greatest fame. The two younger brothers, 
who joined him in his expedition, died of cholera in Nicaragua. His 
sister, described as the sanest of the four, spent her life ffi3.rried to a 
ffi3.n from Kentucky. She, who outlived all her brothers, spent her life 
quietly in Louisville. 75 
During the first twenty years of his life, William derronstrated a 
prcdigal intelligence. He graduated from the University of Nashville at 
the age of fourteen. He then traveled north to attend and graduate from 
the Pennsylvania Medical School by the time he was nineteen. Then it was 
off to Europe to study more medicine and travel a bit. 76 He seemed ready 
to join his father as another prominent member of Nashville society. 
Ho.vever, in 1845, now returned from Europe, William suffered the 
first of two personal tragedies. His rrother died. The young Walker, 
devoutedly attached to her, was heartbroken. He SVoDre to never practice 
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medicine again; a promise that he kept. 77 
The still young Walker then switched to'law. Mastering this quickly, 
he embarked on his new career. That career change involved an address 
change. Walker set up his first practice in New orleans. 78 Apparentl y he 
could not bear to live in Nashville any longer. 
Walker sPent the next four years of his life in this city. During 
this time he beca.IT'e partners with a man named Edrrnnd Randolph. Randolph 
became a lasting friend and confidant of Walker. Walker also met, fell in 
love with and apparently courted, Ellen Galt Martin, a young wc:man of 
similar social background. While living in New orleans, he also found 
another love: walker began writing for a local newspap?r. These 
journalistic and love interests took Walker away from his practice and 
soon Randolph was running the law firm on his own. 
Then, in the summer of 1849, Ellen Martin died of yellow fever. The 
second of the personal tragedies had struck. Walker walked out of his 
newspap?r job and law practice. He disapp?ared. 79 
A few months later, he turned up in San Francisco. It was nCMT 1850. 
Walker was twenty-six. How he came to be in San Francisco has becane 
sanething of a mystery. No published sources have agreed on when or how he 
arrived. 
Unlike most unemployed arrivals, Walker did not continue on into the 
hill s to look for gold. He turned to his p?n and became a journal is t 
again. He became a managing editor of the san Francisco Herald. Soon he 
was well known for his attacks on corruption. His popular stories on the 
iIrproprieties of a local judge forced him to renew his practice of the 
law within a short time. 80 
Walker also renewed his friendship with Etlmund Randolfi'l in san 
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Francisco. Randolph had left New Orleans at about the same time Walker 
disappeared fran that city. While Walker was writing for the Herald, 
Randolph was busily taking a part in organizing the state legislature. 
Sorreho.v this journalist, with his bold pen, becarre involved in 
filibustering. There is nothing in his past to have p::>inted him in such a 
direction. He had no fonrel military training. However, he did enter the 
career with enthusiasm. Instead of joining in with an experienced man, 
Walker started up::>n filibustering as his own carrrT'ander. He launched an 
ill-fated expedition into Sonora, Mexico in 1853. It was a miserable 
failure, but Walker returned a hero anyway. At least he was a hero in the 
Pap2rs; in governrrent circles he was a criminal. He was arrested and 
brought to san Francisco to stand trial. 
His trial was for violating a neutrality law that was used to stop 
filibustering expeditions fran being organized and launched from within 
u.s. jurisdiction. The trial, held in OCtober 1854, ended in Walker's 
acquittal. He was, of course, carpletely guilty of the charge, but no 
jury in california would convict him. He was, reportedly, carried out of 
the courthouse on the shoulders of the jury that jUdged him. 81 He was in 
the spotlight once again. 
It was aDnost immediately after this trial that Walker and Cole had 
their meeting. The place and time have not survived, but the subject 
matter did. Walker refused the contract on the grounds that it violated 
neutrality law. 82 Walker had just finished his trial for violating the 
same law and, undoubtedly, wanted to avoid the experience again. He 
reportedly sent Cole back down to Nicaragua to renegotiate. 
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Cole was down and back within two months. He then delivered this 
second contract to Walker, now living in S3.crarnento, by early Febuary, 
1855. 83 Walker accepted this new contract and rroved back to San 
Francisco. He began outfitting his expedition there. 
Bryon Cole's negotiating these contracts and his traveling back and 
forth between San Francisco and Nicaragua to satisfy Walker is curious. 
There was no logical reason for him to travel down to Nicaragua, negotiate 
a contract without a clear ability to fulfill the terms, return to S3.n 
Francisco to find sorrebcrly to fill those terms and then do it all over 
again after talking to Walker. Cole VvDuld have spent several rronths and 
hundreds of dollars in a scherre in which he had no clear financial gain. 
He acted rrore like an agent-for-hire rather than an individual 
entrepreneur. Cole's later involvement with Walker reinforces the thesis 
that Cole only played a minor role. He died in Nicaragua as a lesser 
officer in Walker's army. 84 
From Walker's rrove to San Francisco until the night he slipped out of 
San Francisco harbor on !-1ay 4, Walker's actions "M2re the subject of much 
speculation. A number of sources have him partaking in several adventures 
during these eighty or so days. W1ile they are interesting, these 
adventures seem to be more fiction than truth. What is true is that 
Walker: 
1.	 got a guarantee from the local U.S. District Attorney 
that his expedition VvDuld not be considered a violation of 
U.S.	 neutrality law; 
2.	 recruited fifty-seven rren to sail with him; 
3.	 got no visible support fram any of the wealthy men living In 
that city; 
4.	 chartered the Brig Vesta and sailed away during the late 
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night hours of May 4; and 
5. arrived in Nicaragua on June 16, 1855. 
Because of that initial decision of his not being in violation of 
neutrality law, Walker was able to proceed with his organizing in the 
open. There was apparentl y no need to conceal any portion of his 
activities. Still, there are inconsistencies between the several available 
sources of information about those eighty days. There are also many gaps. 
This makes discovery of what really occurred during those days 
impossible. That is curious. 
Walker was not engaged in an illegal act, but he seemed to want to 
keep many of his actions secretive anyway. There ~e rrore questions than 
answ=rs about that period. Walker's use of the Vesta to go to Nicaragua 
both provides clues to sane of the true aspects of his expedition and 
shQ\olS sane of the errors in newspaper and booklength accounts pub1ished in 
Walker's lifetime. Yet, those clues cannot fill in all of the gaps ln 
Walker's actions. 
Walker's choice of transportation offers a valuable view of one 
aspect of his expedition. This is because every U. s. ship had to be 
registered. That registration information was recorded. Any changes had to 
be reported and a new license issued to account for changes ln 
registration information. This record-keeping on ships was carefully 
followed and a ship's papers w=re of utmost importance. No ship could 
enter or leave a U.S. port without presenting the ship's papers and a 
current operating license. 'rhe thoroughness of the federal goverrurent ln 
this one area of commerce provides an opportunity to trace the ownership, 
ship's masters, prices paid for each ship and final disposition of every 
ship whose records have survived. 
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The registration of the Vesta is arrong those surviving records. From 
the registration history of that ship, it is possible to trace both the 
ownership and moverrents of Vesta throughout the last several months of 
1855. The information on that ship provides an insight into some of the 
financial deal ings surrounding Walker's preparations. It shONs some of the 
inconsistencies between what did happen and the first-hand accounts 
written at the time. The follONing transactions becooe evident from that 
data: 
1.	 On April 13, 1855, one Sanuel A. Davis purchased the Vesta 
from Charles H. H3.mison for $2850 and declared himself master 
of the vessel. He licensed the ship for coastal trade. The 
ship had been licensed for such trade the previous three years. 
2.	 On April 21, 1855, one N. K. Lamson purchased the brig from 
Davis for $3350 and listed E. Briggs as master. He licensed 
the ship for ocean trade. 
3.	 On April 28, 1855, ownership of the ship was transferred 
sorrehow to one C. T. M. L3rnson (a v..Qman) and an M. D. Eyre 
listed as master. This L3rnson also licensed the ship for ocean 
trade. 
4.	 On July 31, 1855, one Charles Richardson purchased the brig 
at public auction in Realejo, Nicaragua for an unkncwn 
price. Charles Turnbull became master. M. D. Eyre was the 
selling agent. 
5.	 Sorretime between July and C£tober James I'otNubb became the 
master. (The registration was danaged in a fire and a few 
words were burned at this edge of the paper. ) 
6.	 On ex;tober 2, 1855, one Davis Osborn, a whaler, purchased 
the brig for $950 in Punta Arenas, Costa Rica. James I'otNubb 
was the selling agent. Osborn dismantled the ship for scrap 
in this port within the following few days. 85 
N. K. Lamson purchased the ship just two weeks before Walker sailed 
out of the harbor and changed the license from coastal to ocean trade. 
This is a strong indication that the vessel was purchased solely for 
Walker's use. The subsequent sale of the ship in Realejo at public sale 
reinforces this thesis. Eyre reportedly sold the ship to raise money to 
payoff its crew. 86 The sale of the ship there could not have been 
profi table for Lamson~ unless he had already made his money from Walker 
earlier. 
The new owner, Charles Richardson, owned the ship for less than two 
months before selling it for scrap. He, or his sailing master, only sailed 
the ship fram Realejo to Punta Arenas via San Juan del Sur. 87 Richardson 
apparently never made an attempt to put the ship into service before 
selling it. 
That last selling price was less than one third of her April selling 
price. Vesta had been anchored in Puntas Arenas since septEmber 6. when 
she was sold. 88 
These sales for shinking prices and the easy freedom with which 
Lamson and Richardson treated their new investment all point to Walker's 
gaining use of the ship for his own benefit. There was never any visible 
attempt by any of the ONners to make a profit with the brig. 
This information on the ship supports the lack of any significant 
financial help from any of the wealthy rren in San Francisco. The Vesta was 
not owned by any well-knaNn men of that city. In fact, the ONners had no 
connection with Walker other than owning the ship. 
W1y Walker did not just buy that ship outright is also a gocd 
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question. There is every indication that he and his men were the only crew 
the ship had on the trip. Walker's expedition was legal. There was no 
logical justification for his renting the ship from another owner. 
The purchase of and apparent renting of a coastal sailing ship and 
the subsequent sail ing of that ship to Nicaragua does not rrake sense 
either. Lamson p3.id out a healthy profit to Davis in April and practically 
gave the ship to Walker. Then Lamson faded into obscurity. Walker had 
rented the ship, and yet he acted like the a.vner. later, that ship was 
sold, but Walker continued to use it. NObcrly owning Vesta used it nonnally 
that year. The ship's registry offers no satisfactory answers. 
However, the physical description of the brig and the size of the 
expedition does go a long way toward explaining the five weeks needed to 
sail from san Francisco to Realejo. Vesta was eighty-two feet long and 
twenty-two feet wide. 89 This \oX:luld make tight quarters for fifty-seven 
men plus whatever cargo the boat carried. A prudent sailing master, 
without a trained crew, would have spent sone time in ports along the way. 
This would make for a long, slow trip. 
Walker arrived in Realejo on June 16, 1855. 90 He inmEdiately 
traveled on to Leon. There, he net with castellon. It was a short visit. 
Ten days later Walker and his army embarked on the Vesta for their 
first battle. They sailed the brig south to the transit p::>rt of san Juan 
del SUr. There Walker disembarked his small army and set out to find the 
enEmY. They found the Conservative army and fought a battle on June 29th in 
the village of Rivas. This was the provincial capital of the southwestern 
coast of Nicaragua and close to the transit. It was a defeat for Walker. 
He fled back to the coast and then on to the Liberal port at Realejo. 91 
Walker and his anny \oX:luld not enter the field again until September. 
In the meantime, Walker spent his tine negotiating with the Liberals in 
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Leon. His anny, now referred to as the American Phalanx, spent their time 
recovering from wounds and resting in Realejo. 92 
Walker's entry into the Nicaraguan civil war had come as a surprise 
to both the then U.S. minister, John Wheeler, and Secretary of State, 
William Marcy, despite Walker articles in New York and san Francisco 
paj:€rs. Wheeler's first mention of Walker occurred only after that first 
battle. Marcy's dispatches, in response to Wheeler's discription of the 
battle, were pleas for more information. 93 
While U.S. officials were trying to figure out who he was, Walker was 
gaining power of attorney over the Nicaraguan transit. This was done 
during his negotiations of July and August of 1855. 94 That po~r was 
granted that August by Castellon. It was an unusual concession because the 
Liberals had no authority over the transit themselves at this point. 
Walker had no reason to expect to exercise his new powers unless he and 
his Liberal partners were more successful in the civil war. Walker had 
played his hand here. He was interested in more than helping the Liberals 
in return for land. He wanted the transit. 
Walker wanted the transit for a reason. W1ile he was loath to explain 
his motives in his own book and other sources have glossed over this 
concession, that agreanent was reached as part of sane specific objective. 
Unfortunately, that objective has never been identified. Now there is only 
speculation about those motives. 
Whatever the motives for wanting that control, once Walker had 
potential legal control of the transit in his hands, he set out to gain 
the transit itself. In August, he boarded the Vesta again. Retracing his 
steps back to the Conservative-held transit, he engaged the Conservatives 
1n another battle. This tirre he was successful. Walker defeated the 
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Conservative army. 'I'hat army fled to Granada. Walker stayed in the field. 
The transit, IM2st of the lake , was now his. 
That trip in August was the last of Walker's three uses of Vesta. 
Shortly after walker's second battle, the ship sailed for Punta Arenas, 
Costa Rica I where it anchored until it was sold in OCtober. The brig wa s 
destroyed and her logbooks disappeared. 
That first victory for Walker gained a monetary reward from an 
interesting source. A man named Charles J. McDonald, an agent of Cornelius 
Garrison, handed over $20,000 in gold to Walker. 95 This money was part 
of a gold bullion shipnent pa.ssing through the isthmus. McDonald took out 
gold and replaced it with an IOU from Morgan in New York. Morgan honored 
that note. 
This loan of OCtober 1855 indicates either the employment of Walker 
by Cornelius Garrison to remove Conservative control of the transit or 
Garrison's opportunistic support of Walker after his first victory for the 
Liberal cause. Walker's interest in the transit, McDonald's ability to 
loan money and the San Francisco origins of Walker's expedition supports 
the forrrer supposition. The lack of any firm connection betlM2en Walker and 
Garrison until that loan supfX>rts the latter. Whether or not Walker and 
Garrison IM2re associated from the onset, the loan marked a link that would 
bind Walker's fate to Garrison's support. While Walker had that support he 
was successful. When it ended, so did Walker's expedition. 
Walker had defeated the Conservative army, yet he had not destroyed 
it. W1ile that army could still fight. Walker's victory was only 
temporary. To finish his job, Walker needed to strike a telling blow. The 
capture of Granada would be such a bloo. But with the still polM2rful 
Conservative army between him and that city, a land attack would be out of 
the question. This left a lake approach. 
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Walker then either forcibly boarded one of the Accessary Transit Co. 
lake stearrers or was given the use of one by M::Donald to attack the 
Conservative capital. That battle was another Liberal victory. It was also 
the end of the Conservative governrrent in Nicaragua. Walker occupied 
Granada, forced a treaty between Liberals and Conservatives, and set up a 
provisional government. 
That governrrent was a canbination of Liberals, Conservatives and 
Walker's men. Patricio Rivas, a moderate Conservative, was chosen as 
President. 96 
John Wheeler extended U.S. recognition to that govemrrent a few days 
later. 97 unfortunately for Walker, granting recognition was beyond 
Wheel er 's authori ty. Marcy had instructed him to refuse such recognition, 
and when Wheeler's notification of his recognition arrived in Washington, 
Marcy withdrew it. 98 The Pierce administration refused to deal with a 
provisional government installed by force. 
Nor could the Pierce Administration afford to recognize that 
government. To do so v..Duld have pitted the U.S. and England ~n a 
controversy over a possible u.s. violation of Clayton-Bulwer and perhaps 
brought on war. While there was no specific reference to this treaty in 
the various dispatches between Marcy and his scattered diplomats at the 
time, earlier reactions over the more insignificant Prometheus Affair 
provides a preview of what should have been expected. English 
sensitivitives over treaty violations were undoubtedly influencial in any 
decision over withholding diplomatic recognition of the Rivas governrrent 
by the Pierce administration. 
This refusal to recognize the new Nicaraguan government was followed 
by a proclaIT'ation forbidding any U.S. citizen's participation ~n 
58. 
filibustering. 99 This allowed crlinina1 prosecution of individuals 
heading for Nicaragua. It was an extraordinary extension of the neutrality 
law forbidding the organizing of filibustering expeditions in the U.S. 
District Attorneys II.Bre thereafter instructed to use all means to stem the 
shipnent of either men or materials to Walker. 
Those means II.Bre not successful. There II.Bre several obstacles to 
overcome in enforcing the proclamation. The District Attorneys were faced 
with both popular resentment and a lack of hard evidence. Vocal PJrticns 
of the various communities where potential filibusters could set sail for 
Nicaragua II.Bre opposed to federal interference with Walker's expedition 
and new recruits. Under the definition of neutrality law, only the 
organizing of expeditions in the U.S. was illegal. This meant that support 
for an already-launched expedition was a questionable legal issue. It was 
also a difficult task to distinguish between a would-be filibuster and 
miner or settler. 
This federal attempt at stopping the shipnent of recruits on 
Accessary Transit Co. ships developed into a cat and rrouse game between 
the company and local District Attorneys in New York and san Francisco. 
The officials would conduct futile searches of company ships. Company 
officers would then protest vehemently. The undiscovered recruits would 
then sail toward Nicaragua. 
In the South, larger sectional issues and popular support allowed 
rrore op2n recruiting for Walker. In the large PJrts of New Orleans and 
Mobile, District Attorneys had even less success than in New York and san 
Francisco. There, recruits answered newspaper advertisements for Walker's 
anny and sailed alrrost uI1l'T"Olested. 
en the following March 14th, news of Nicaraguan revocation of the 
1851 transit charter and confiscation of all Accessary Transit Co. 
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prop2rty then in Nicaragua reacred New York. 100 What appeared on the 
surface as a long overdue reaction to the deceptive practices of that 
canpany had finally occurred. However, that news was only the sma.ll tip of 
a much rrore interesting and involved plot. Garrison and Morgan ~re 
playing a trump card in their feud with Vanderbilt. In a brillant and 
unscrupulous manuever, these two men solved the rrounting difficulties 
threatening their control over the canp:my and gained much profit at 
Vanderbilt's expense. 
This ma.nuever, apparently hatched in Garrison's offices, gained 
rnc:rnentum bet~en Walker's victory in Granada and the end of November. 
After Walker and the Liberals had defeated the Conservatives in Nicaragua 
and the civil war was over, C. J. McDonald returned to San Francisco and 
informed Garrison of events along the transit. Between Mc[X)nald's arrival 
ln early NoverIDer and his subsequent departure a rronth later, much 
planning was done. Garrison and his 1awyers, A. P. Crittenden and Edrrurrl 
Randolph, drafted two documents needed to revoke the charter and then sign 
over a new one to E}:)mmd Randolph. 101 After doing this, Garrison then 
sent his son, W. C. Garrison, along with Randolph and McDonald back dONn 
to Nicaragua with the documents. 102 
These men met with Walker in Granada. There is no surviving record of 
what occurred during these meetings. Ho.vever, they ~re exclusive of any 
Nicaraguans and conducted behind closed doors. 103 
Walker's desire to have po.ver of attorney over the transit in August 
brings this plot into focus. Walker's reason for wanting poNer of attorney 
could have been obviously linked with Garrison's desire to have 
Vanderbi 1t ' s charter revoked. That would mean that the two were united 
from the beginning and that Garrison intended to use Walker to revoke the 
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charter all along. 
The presence of Edmund Randolph, Walker's old law partner and 
longtime friend, also adds weight to the thought of Walker being 
Garrison's agent in Nicaragua. Randolph was both Garrison's lawyer and 
Walker's friend. He would have been a ready connection between the two. 
It was shortly after arriving in Nicaragua that W.C. Garrison 
continued on to New York. There, he net with Morgan in mid January of 
1856. He then returned to Nicaragua, arriving by early Febuary. 
Morgan had just recently acceded to Vanderbilt's desire of regaining 
the canpany. He had stepped da-m fran his offices within the canp3.1ly just 
before the young Garrison arrived. He proceeded to followed that 
resignation by selling his and Garrison's 20,000 shares of Accessary 
Transit Co. stock after his mid-January rreetings with the young Garrison. 
This occurred throughout January and Febuary. 104 Mc>rgan appeared to be 
defeated and on his way out. 
But that was only theater. Morgan was merely setting the stage for 
the charter revocation. His resignation and steck sales were to ensure 
that would be no losses on his part fran holding canp3.1ly stock when news 
of the upcoming revocation reached New York. The resignation allowed for 
the rapid sale of large blocks of stock without raising any questions. 
Then, with that done, Morgan set out to make a "killing" on the steck 
market by going "short" on Accessary Transit Co. steck. 105 
This concept of going "short" on stock involves cootracting to sell 
shares of a stock at a set price in the future. This simply means that a 
seller agrees to sell a specified amount of a stock to a buyer at a 
mutually agreed upon price on a mutually agreed upon date. This can be 
profitable in that one can sell stock at a higher prlce on the delivery 
date than that stock was purchased for before that delivery date. It is 
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normally a gamble for both buyer and seller, but in this case it was not a 
gambl e for Morgan as seller. Morgan knew that the bottom v.ould fallout of 
Accessary Transit Co. stock as soon as news of the revocation hit the 
Exchange. The buyers v.ere the only ones gambling and they were going to 
lose. 
The principal buyer at this point was Cornelius Vanderbilt. He wanted 
to gain canplete control over the canpany and bought up all available 
shares. He was the one to be left holding worthless stocks in a non­
existant canpany. Morgan was outfoxing him. 
While Morgan was setting the stage for his "killing" in New York, 
Walker and Randolph v.ere finishing the final touches on the two docurrents 
that Patricio Rivas was going to sign. After the go-ahead was given by 
Morgan, through the younger Garrison, Walker took the first docurrent, the 
revocation , to Rivas. 
Rivas got his first look at this paper just before he signed it on 
Febuary 18, 1856.106 By Walker's acmunt, Rivas was more than willing to 
sign the document. 
en the following day, Walker presented the new charter to Rivas. 107 
Rivas demurred from signing his na.rre. He apparently realized what he was 
signing away and what Walker was attempting at this point. Walker had to 
awly sane sort of coercion before Rivas agreed to sign. 
Whatever coercion was used to get Rivas' name on that paper was never 
delineated. Walker claimed that Rivas only wanted to change a few clauses 
and then wa s satisf ied. 108 Hov.ever , the presence of severa1 hundred 
armed North Arrericans just beyond his front door might have played more 
heavily on Rivas' mind than the wording of a few passages of a new 
charter. 
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NON there only remained the matter of publicizing the revocation and 
Randolph's selling his charter to somel:x:xly. The publicity alxmt the old 
charter arrived in New York on March 14, 1856.109 The Accessary Transit 
Co. stock plumrreted. Morgan rrade his killing. Garrison rrade his share of 
the profit. Randolph appa.rently sold his interest to Morgan. Randolph's 
transactions Vl.'2re never publicized. 
Morgan and Garrison had completed their coup. Their profits were over 
a quarter of a million dollars. Vanderbilt had been cheated again. This 
time there was no note threatening ruin. The less of the op=rating charter 
and his stock holdings, WDrth over a million dollars, was too expensive. 
Vanderbilt was hurt too deeply. He set out to recoup his loss of money and 
prestige with a vengeance. He launched out on several different fronts at 
once. 
Vanderbilt attempted to get State Department support. Only a few days 
after the revocation and stock crash, he wrote several letters to Marcy in 
Washington, claiming various crimes by Morgan and the rest. Marcy refused 
to help. 110 
He filed various suits against Morgan, Garrison and Walker in the 
New York courts. Alleging illegal acts against the stockholders, 
Vanderbilt asked for large monetary awards. These actions failed. III 
Vanderbilt's third front achieved the success denied by government 
and legal cfficials. Wall Street was a battleground where Vanderbilt could 
fight his business enemies on his 0NI1 tenns. He regan by stopping all 
ships under Accessary Transit Co. control from sailing. 112 He then sent 
out letters ordering the others to avoid Nicaragua and proceed to 
Panamanian ports. He quickly renegotiated the $40,000 monthly blackmail 
from his old Panarranian rivals. 113 
While Vanderbilt was regrouping from the March 14th blow, Morgan and 
63·
 
Garrison were reorganizing a new company to begin transit operations 
again. These efforts proceeded slowly. Their first ship did not sail until 
a month after the revocation. 114 
In Nicaragua, Walker was following up his confiscation of Accessary 
'rransi t Co. property with a carmission to determine the monetary extent of 
the old canpany's holdings in Nicaragua. By apparently capricious means, 
this commission arrived at a figure of $412,589.16. 115 The value 
determined by this commission was considerably less than a corrpany 
statement of OCtober 1855 which listed a value of $537,621 for that same 
property. 116 Walker was exercising another bit of legal finery. 
After arriving at his curious figure, Walker allo,yed Morgan and 
Garrison to purchase the confiscated property for one-fourth of that 
arrount. That arrangement was a pat:er transaction by which Morgan and 
Garrison merely wrote off transportation expenses of recruits, freight, 
and all money advanced to Walker in exchange for the canpany property. 11 7 
This was at least a further gain of $300,000 by the two. Walker was 
helping them make a fortune. 
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The ink had barely dried on his revocation docurrents before Walker was 
forCBd to take up arms against his Conservative enemy once again. This 
time those Conservatives were fran Costa Rica. That country declared war 
on Walker and his filibusters on March 1, 1856. 118 
The declaration of war was the culmination of the grievances of 
several different groups hurt by Walker's Liberal victory in Granada. 
First, there was walker's association with Nicaraguan Liberals. 
Conservatives throughout Central Arrerica feared a reversion to Liberal 
control. second, there was Walker's identification with United States 
interests and the concept of "t13.nifest Destiny". Some Englishmen saw 
Walker as an agent of the United States and his expedition as a violation 
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Lastly, there was Walker's disruption of the 
international status quo in Central America. His victory cast various 
treaties and concessions into doubt. Vanderbilt's concession had already 
been revoked. Walker was in a position to hold other concessions for 
ransom as well. 
Once Walker had identified himself with the Liberals, he adopted the 
whole Liberal faction in Central Arrerica. This aligned him with their 
gools of returning to a federal republic, a decrease in state autonany, 
and a reduction of Church power. Walker espoused Liberal gools throughout 
his expedition. He also adopted their enemies. 'I'hose enemies included 
Central Arrerican Conservatives, England and the catoolic Church. Vhile 
Walker and his filibusters served as a rallying point for Liberals, they 
had also antagonized a powerful opposition. 
Walker and his anned Americans were thought of as a vanguard of a 
U. S. annexation attEmpt in Central Arrerica by Central Arrerican 
nationalists and members of the English Parliament. 119 Walker's 
Arreri cans were seen as a force allowed into the region as a pretext to 
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draw American troc:ps into Nicaragua in support of Arrerican 1i ves and 
property. Indeed, this v.as similar to U.S. actions surrounding its war 
with Mexico ten years earHer . 
Walker's expedition threatened the internationa1 s tatus quo arrong the 
U.S., Britain, and Central Arrerica. His success in Granada jeopardized 
several treaties and established concessions. He could not be supp:xted by 
the United States without a risk of war because of the Clayton-Bulv.Br 
Treaty. Support for walker v.Duld have violated the treaty. British 
control of the Mosquito Protectorate and San Juan del Norte v.Bre 
threatened. Central American Conservatives feared for both their lives and 
property under Walker's potential Liberal rule. walker threatened IT'Ost of 
these established interests by entering the civil war on the Liberal side 
and winning that war. These Conservatives were protecting their continued 
political hegelT'Ony by fighting Walker. 
The declaration of war from Costa Rica displayed a sophistication 
that reflected foreign interest in the upcoming battles. It was limited to 
Walker and his troc:ps. There was no mention of the Nicaraguan Liberals. 
Unless they elected to serve with Walker, these Liberals were beyond the 
threat of war. This stipulation was a well thought out attempt to strip 
Walker of any Liberal allies. As it was doubtful that Conservatives v.Duld 
have voluntarily excluded their hated enemies of the past twenty years 
from any war, it is probable that the decision was influenced by another 
power with. interests in the region. Britain had the greatest interest in 
the region outside of the United States and the greatest influence over 
Costa Rica in 1856. 
The declaration included a blockade of the san Juan River. Such a 
rnanuever v.Duld have affected British interests, since the British 
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controlled the mouth of that river. That decision would have been foolish 
without Costa Rican guarantees to England beforehand. Since English 
interests would have suffered from a complete blockage of all trade along 
that river, that clause in the declaration implied English epdorsement of 
Costa Rican war plans. 
Evidence of such collusion between Costa Rica and England is 
circumstancial. There are no records avai lable in published sources that 
tie the two together:. The only evidence available is that England sold 
muskets to the Costa Ricans and that English officers and agents served 
alongside C?sta Rican troops throughout. the war. 120 Whether or not the 
I!luskets and Englishrren \o.Bre in the 'battles by official sanction or private 
design cannot be suestantiated by the materials available. However, it is 
likely that England and Costa Rica did plan and conduct the war together. 
English interests were oriented toward Conservative rule and £.ive separate 
states rather than a Central Aneri,?an republic by ul<it year. Britain had 
much to gain by supporting Costa Rica and much tc lose by not supporting 
its Conservative rulers. 
This develofIIlent is im{::::ortant because it finished the shift In
• 
British. preferences toward Conservative governrrent within the region. It 
reinforces the thesis that Britain supp:>rted whatever goverrurent could 
offer s~ability and continuation of established trade concessions-- i.e. 
any government that provided stability. 
The war started badly. ~or Walker, but then swung in his favor as a 
cholera epidemic decirrated Costa Rican troops a few weeks after the war 
had begun. That plague, just recently introduced to Central America by way 
of India, soon erased any opportunity for a Costa Rican victory. The army 
was forced to flee in the face of this myster~oys killer. Its.retreat was 
marked by a trai 1 of corpses as the disease raged una'bated throughout the 
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ranks. Once in Costa Rica, the infected army spread cholera throughout the 
countryside. Thousands died that surrrrrer. 
While the epidemic gave Walker a respite from Conservative attack~, 
he scx;m found other dangers to take its place. The new rrenace arose in the 
fonn of petty politicking, diplcrnatic intrigues, and financial scheming. 
It "WaS not warfare by force of anTIS, but it was just as deadly. 
In Nicaragua, Walker lost his president. Rivas, angered by the new 
transit concession and fearful over Walker's prestige from his rout of 
the Costa Ricans, fled Leon for other Conservative amies massing to the 
north. 121 Even though Rivas was only a provisional president, he did give 
credibili ty to the story that Walker was an employee of the Nicaraguan 
govertrrnent. When he left, that cloak of legitimacy was rerroved. 
Without ,Rivas,· Walker lost his original reason for l:eing in 
Nicaragua. He needed a facade of popular leadership to gain international 
recognition and U.S. support. Without a Nicaraguan president, Walker's 
provi,si ana 1 government was nothing more than a farce. Walker needed a 
popularly elected president and cabinet to present to foreign governments. 
He rrade an effort to find this new basis for his legitimacy. He quickly 
organized an election, published apparently fictitious results and 
declared himself president. 122 Canpleted in only two weeks, it was a 
shallON attempt at legitimizing the expedition. 
This election outraged central American Conservatives. They conderrned 
it as a fraud. Such reactions, comnon to losing parties in Central 
America, were not as i.rrq;:ortant as the international reaction. Other 
governments also suspected fraud. England refused to honor the election. 
Marcy withdrew the U.S. recognition President Pierce had extended tc the 
Rivas gQvernment just a month before. 123 The Conservatives knew and 
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these two governments suspected that Walker had becane president of 
Nicaragua in name only. Marcy thought that Walker's real p:>wer rested In 
his army, not in a majority supp:>rt by the Nicaraguan people. 124 
Despi te the p:>l i ticking, new recruits and suppl ies for Walker's army0 
still arrived on Accessary Transit Co. ships from the United States every 
few weeks. Niether President Pierce's proclamation of December 1855 or his 
Federal Marshalls had been successful in stopping the flCM'. Those 
shipments were crucial to walker's survival. His army would quickly wither 
away without a steady stream of men and materiel. Since those supplies 
depended on the whims of Walker 'so U.S. partners, Morgan and Garrison, 
Walker's fate rested in their hands. 
These shipping magnates were unreliable at best. They were governed 
by profit ratios and p:>tential revenue. Only as long as the Nicaraguan 
trade turned a profit would their supp:>rt of Walker continue. When it was 
in their interest to supply Walker, they WJuld. When it was in their best 
interest: to drop Walker, they would do that too. This was because Walker's 
supply line was also a passenger line. Vhile Walker received men and 
equipment, the main business was to ferry paying passengers and gold 
between California and the east coast. If Morgan and Garrison ran their 
ships to supply walker without the plausible excuse of ferrying 
passengers, then they WJuid have been open for prosecution under U.S. 
neutrali ty laws as well as losing rroney. There had to be passenger traffic 
and it had to remain profitable to provide for both a legitimate and 
financial justification to continue ferrying Walker's supplies. That 
traffic had continued throughout the year walker had already spent °in 
Nicaragua. The transit was still profitable in 1856. 
These facts were appreciated in New York by both Vanderbi 1t and 
Morgan. Both men appreciated the legal dangers of supplying Walker. Both 
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realized that there were profits to be made fran the concession, but their 
rrotives differed. Morgan wanted to continue operations and sell. 
Vanderbil t war:ted to stop opera~~ons and buy. Both continued to manuever 
on Wall Street. In June, vanderbilt offered Walker $250,000 to return the 
transit. 125 At about the sarre tirre, Randolp! was peddling his 
concession in Vanderbilt's offices for $300,000. 126 
Both offers were refused. Walker rejected Vanderbilt's offer out of 
loyalty to his two partners, Morgan and Garris01. ~27 It was, of course, 
a rrQsplaced loyalty on Walker's part. Neither Morgan nor Garrison was 
overly concerned with Walker. Vanderbilt's reasons W2re never reported. 
The atterrpt by Mo~gan's agent to sell- his concession was an 
indication Of Morgan's lack <;:>f interest in an investment beginning to show 
a dismal future. As .news of wa{'fare in, Nicaragua and canpletion of the 
railroad across Panama. reached ea~tern cities, ticket sal~s dropped at his 
offices. Morgan apparently saw a potential loss of transit operations 
because of Nicaraguan warfare and a reduction in his profit ratio because 
of the railroad. With the decline in revenue-producing passengers his 
canpany would also becane more and more suspect for neutrality law 
violations. He reacted with atterrpts to s~ll out before the transit 
operations began to lose rroney and hence become unmarketable. 
Yet that was not to be, since Vanderbilt would not b~y fran him. 
Other wealthy investors steered clear of the dispute. Morgan was forced to 
hold on to the concession. He made the best of a deteriorating i!1vestrnent. 
He continued to support Walker and transl,X)rt gold and passengers through 
Nicaragua. It was a choice of necessity on Morgan's part. 
This is evident by the timing of Morgan's decision to buy the 
confiscated r~operty only after Vanderbilt had refused to buy the 
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concession. 128 From the attempt at unloading the transit before that 
assumption of the prop=rty, it is obvious that Morgan's group wanted to 
drop the transit in favor of other investments. Support for Walker was 
waning aft~r March of 1856. 
Vanderbilt'~ refusal of Morgan's proxy offer must have been related 
to the asking price. Morgan obviously wanted too much in return for the 
concession. Vanderbilt wanted the concession, but only at a reasonable 
price. The rronthy payrrents Vanderbi 1t was extorting from his Panamanian 
route rivals for not compet~ng against them apparently also figured into 
his scheme. With a concession to o~rate. in Nicaragua, Vanderbilt could 
have bargained for more money in exchange for less competition. Later 
developrrents, after Vanderbil t did regain the opportunity to operate his 
ships in Nj.caragua, but did not resume operations, reinfo~ce the 
hypothesis that he intended to do no more than use. the t:oncession as 
leverage in extortion. 
Conservative armies in and around Nicaragua had been ,gaining strength 
and planning ca.rrp3.igns against Walker all this time. The Costa Rican 
defeat was only to be a setba<;k to the Conservative cause, not the end of 
the war. In the fall of 1856, after the hot summer months had passed, 
these armies began their advance toward Granada and Walker. 
Walker's position was precarious after the summer. He was outnumbered 
in Nicaragua. His presidency failed to rally any popular sup,port. His hope 
of ~terial support in rren and materiel 'from the O. S. government was lost. 
President Pierce had refused to recognize his government. Marcy had even 
relieved Wheeler after he continued to support Walker's position. 129 
Morgan and Garrison were becaning only reluctant allies. Vanderbilt was 
against him. The British continued their quiet support of his Conservative 
enemies. 
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At this point in his expedition, ~valker seened a defeated man~ It was 
only a rmtter of time before his political, economic, and diplormtic 
failures were matched with military defeat as well. His only real hope for 
victory had been U. S. recognition and support. When that did not 
materialize, his chances faded. 
Walker had attempted to gain recognition and support through the 
organization of a Nicaraguan provisional governrrent and his "election" as 
president of Nicaragua. These acts were apparently designed to gain 
support in the united States. 
When Walker organized his provisional government under Patricio 
Rivas, he was attempting to provide a cloak of legitinacy to his 
eXPedition. He must have been hoping this would allow President pierce to 
extend diplaratic reccgnitioo. With that done, it v.Duld have been a simple 
task to ask for protectorate status or get u.S. protection along the 
transit. 
That potential reaction by President pierce would have been the 
logical extension of earlier developnents. The united States position 
since 1850 had been support of a Central American republic of sane sort. 
State Departrrent instructions had encouraged U.S. ministers to prorrote 
this goal. President Pierce was an exp:msionist. He favored u.S. 
annexation of Cuba. The State Department had encouraged the U. S. minister 
to Spain, pierre Soule, to work toward that goal. For Walker to believe 
that this administration v.Duld jump at the opportunity to acquire 
Nicaragua was logical in the face of past administration practice and 
staterrents. 
After such backing, Walker would have been able to extend his control 
by drawing Central American Liberals, who wanted a union of the five 
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states of Central America, into his camp. This would have established the 
basis for development of a republic of the five states. Walker then would 
have been ruler of all Central America. 
W1en President Pierce withdrew recognition after Walker's fictional 
election as president, official u.s. support became unlikely. Yet the 
United States was in the final stages of a sectional split that would soon 
lead to war. The southern U.S. states 'M::re on the verge of seceSSlon. 
These states contained large numbers of men wanting to break away from the 
Union. Walker found these disaffected Southern secessionists to be a 
potential ally. 
Several ardent Southern extremists visited with Wal ker , or his 
associates in the U.S., in the sumrer of 1856. Pierre Soule of Louisiana 
was the most important of these. Soule, who had just resigned from the 
Pierce administration, had been the princip3.1 author of the Ostend 
Manifesto, a declaration of a U.S. desire to take Cuba by finance or 
forOS' . He had just returned from Spain, where he had tried, 
unsuccessfully, to get that government to give up the island. 130 This 
pro-slavery southern secessionist and expansionist marked a significant 
development in the evolution ·of the Walker expedition. 
B3ck in the U.S., Soule had turned his interest to Walker. He 
traveled to Nicaragua and met with Walker several tines. These two 
apparently arrived at sane sort of agreernent: Walker issued a slavery 
decree within Nicaragua shortly after Soule's visit. 131 That visit was 
the obvious catalyst for the decree. That decree and Soule's visit 'M::re 
part of a larger scheme to extend slavery into the Caribbean that was then 
gaining strength in the South. 
Walker's slavery decree of September 1856 was also a fateful decision 
on his part. It was a desperate act. Until that decree, Walker had 
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espoused an abolitionist viewp::lint in his journalistic writings about 
slavery. 132 For him to turn his back on those earlier views rreant that 
Walker was grasping for sup{;X)rt fran any quarter. He was sacrificing his 
values to ad~ieve his goal of power. 
In addition the decree was a foolish act. In the errotional, volatile 
years before the U.S. Civil War, the slavery issue wa·s splitting the U.S. 
apart. Pro-slavery and anti-slavery views had divided the U.S. into 
separate ideological camps which allowed little room for canpranise.. The 
avowedly anti-slavery Republican Party was growing stronger in the North. 
SOuthern extrenists had one foot out of the Union.. Walker's decree rrede 
him a part of this slavery struggle and tied him to the slavery and 
secession camp. 
The decree did help Walker in the short term. He got rrore S4P{;X)rt 
fran the SOuth as a result. Pro-slavery rren from the Kansas territory 
flocked to Walker after U.S. troops had settled that issue. These men were 
part of that scheme then developing within a small group organizing in the 
deep South. 'rhis group of" Southern extrenists, knovm as the Knights of 
the Colden Circle, planned to extend U.S. controlled slavery throughout 
SOuth America and the caribbean. 133 Nicaragua, under walker, would have 
been the first foothold of that plan. Walker's presence and this plan 
brought Circle money and recruits from the Kansas territory to Nicaragua. 
Central Arrerican reaction to this decree WdS universally negative. 
One of the first acts by the original republic in the 1820's had been the 
aboli tion of slavery. Walker's decree provided another fear for 
Conservatives to exploit, that of Americans enslaving native Nicaraguans. 
Walker's attempt to woo the {;X)tential sup{;X)rt of SOuthern extremists only, 
served to a.l ienate Central Americans further. 
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These same Conservatives were on the move to force a showdown with 
Walker in the Fall of 1856. Walker's small army seerred on the verge of 
military defeat. It was then that the S9uthern sUPJ.X)rt breathed new life 
into Walker:s cause. In september, a European soldier-of-fortune narred 
Charles Frederick Henningsen arrived with a load of cannon, arms, 
munitions and recruits. 134 His arrival gave Walker the military 
advantages to put off or even end the chance of Conservative vic~ory. 
Henningsen, born in England, had served in various wars on the 
EurOPean continent before coming to the United States in 1851. Apparently 
tired of campaigning, he settled down to the more mundane life of an 
author in Washington, D.C. He was as adept in society as he was on the 
battlefield and the men and women in that city welcomed him into their 
midst. A dashing figure with a mind to rratch, he quickly became a 
popular guest at Washington parties. 13 5 
While meeting with Washington society, he courted and married a 
wealthy Georgian widow. It was this rrarriage that linked him with the 
Southern cause. Somehow he became a supporter of his new-found friends on 
the slavery issue. They found use of his military experience. This 
newlywed professional soldier was the perfect man to send to Walker. 
Henningsen was on his way to Nicaragua within a month of Soule's trip. 
Henningsen was part of the Southern extremist support for Walker. The 
cannon, arms and munitions arriving with him 'M2re not. That rrateriel was 
supplied by George Law, a New York shipping rragnate and rival of 
Vanderbi 1t ' s. Law was one of the men paying Vanderbi 1t to not run his 
ships. 136 For reasons, now lost, this rnan put $30,000 behind the Southern 
extremists and Walker. 137 
The rationale fOr Law's sUPJ.X)rt of Walker was lost when Law died and 
took his secret to the grave. However, those supplies 'M2re a catalyst of a 
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u.s. government reaction. President Pierce was forced to take firm action 
to settle the increasingly complex Walker problem after this evidence of 
Southern extrEmist support was made clear. The U.S. government was being 
drawn into the confl ict . 
However, the options available to President Pierce were limited. He 
faced a strong Southern bias in Congress. Nurrerous slave-holding states 
threatened secession. Walker was very popular in those states. In that 
errotional time, any overt action to force Walker out of Nicaragua might 
have divided the nation more. Southerners might have flocrled to Nicaragua 
to defend Walker. Anerican troops might have refused to fight fellow 
Americans. Any action had to be carefully planned, covert, and deniable. 
Anything else threatened to tear the nation apart in those years. It VJaS a 
difficult problem for the President. 
Apart fran the internal coocerns, there was the added complexity of 
that clause of the Clayton-&1lwer Treaty concerning the renunciation of 
forceful acquisition of Central American territory by either the U.s. or 
Britain. Continued support of walker by various factioos in the U.S., the 
Southern extremist plan to spread slavery into the Caribbean and South 
Anerica, official reluctance to enforce neutrality law, and the 
considerable investments England held in the region all added up to 
present a serious threat. British interests stood to lose millions of 
pounds if Walker defeated the Conservatives. The Pierce administration 
risked war with Britain by allowing Walker to continue his war and 
material support for him to grow unabated in the United States. If 
President Pierce failed to take sane concrete action to insure Walker's 
failure, the British Foreign Office might have taken that hesitation to 
mean more than weak governrrent, Le. secret support for Walker. 
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Unfortunately, all of this is only speculation. There is no record of 
official U.S.-British hostility over Walker. 138 Walker's name does not 
appear in surviving official correspondence between Marcy and the U.S. 
minister in London. President Pierce's internal concerns do not appear to 
have involved Nicaragua at all. Officially, Walker was not an issue. 
Yet, the very absence of surviving information raises suspicions. 
There should have been sane mention of Walker. He was getting active 
support in the South, was fighting a war with Costa Rica, and was the 
enemy of Conservatives throughout Central America. Britain was selling 
muskets to the Costa Ricans to help their war effort against him. British 
merchants had millions of pounds invested in Centra 1 America. However, 
Walker's name is rare in any correspondence. The absence of Walker's name 
in official dispatches is a significant omission. It suggests a cover-up. 
Later gaps in the official record reinforce this supposition. 
While Walker was welcoming Henningsen and using his new supplies 
against his growing number of Central American enemies, President Pierce 
and the u.S. Navy Department were taking action. Despite the official 
silence, there was curious behavior roth in the White House and the Navy 
Department that fall. In early OCtober, President pierce took a cruise on 
the Home Squadron flagship. That squadron canrrander, Coorncdore Paulding, 
was responsible for the eastern coast of Central America. The trip lasted 
several days, during which President Pierce and the Ccmnodore spent a lot 
of time in meetings. If any records of that cruise were kept, they did not 
survive. Almost a week of the President's life has becane a total blank. 
Neither man ever discussed what occurred on PaUlding's ship after that 
cruise ended on october 14, 1856. 139 
By the erxl of November, Paulding was steaming south out of New York 
in his flagship. He had a bilingual Navy Ccmrander, Charles H. Davis, and 
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a canplete crEfW with which to replace the captain and crew of the U.S.S. 
St. Mary's, then in Panama. 140 
Davis had only been ordered to his new caramnd fifteen days earlier. 
Enlistment of the crew had only been ordered four days before that. 
Canrrander Davis only had two days to inspect his crew aboard Paulding's 
ship before sailing south. 141 
The series of events, fran the first rreetings between -President 
Pierce and Comnodore Paulding to Paulding's ~ighing anchor in New York on 
November 29th, CX::OJrred at a breakneck pace. The actions of the Navy 
DepartJnent ~re canpletely out of the ordinary. secrecy and speed 
surrounded the whole eVOlution. Brief telegrams and letters originated 
almost daily from the Navy Department to the various CcmTB.nds needing to 
know about the trip. None contained any explanation, but simply specified 
tasks to be canpleted as soon as possible. lbth Davis and Paulding 
traveled to Washington and then back to New York for no apparent reason. 
There was no rationale for the flagship to either transport the 
replacement crew or travel to New York to canplete final preparations 
before sailing. 
This curious behavior and haste point to an obvious plan to do 
something about Walker. President Pierce's cruise with Paulding, and the 
secret rreetings aboard that ship, could easily have been Paulding's 
briefings about what was going on in Central Arrerica. The Washington 
meetings which included Davis, could have produced the final decisions and 
plans of action. The sailing from New York, rather than Washington, was, 
undoubtedly, for sorre specific purpose beyond that of simple resuwly. 
Sorrething was afoot that fall. Whatever it was has remained a well-kept 
secret ever since. 
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What Cornnander Davis was ordered to do and whether or not he did as 
he was ordered is irrpossible to determine from official records. They do 
not exist. All the records, the dispatches, orders, sailing instructions, 
letters, and even the U.S.S. St. Mary's log1:x:xJk for that perioo have been 
"lost". There is every indic;ation that they v.Bre intentionally emitted 
from the official record and destroyed. It was as if Davis was never 
officially involved with William Walker. Yet, the omissions only remove 
the specific details of what happened from the record, not that sanething 
was planned and carried out with great haste. 
While President Pierce and the Navy Department were secretly 
plotting against him, Walker was fighting for his life in and around 
Granada. His central Arrerican enemies were closing their noose. Yet, 
Walker was still strong and his supply lines v.Bre still cpen. With more 
recruits, supplies, and continued attrition of his enemies, there was 
still a slim possibility that he could carryon until the Conservatives 
grew tired. With another cholera epidemic within Conservative ranks, he 
might even repeat his ear lier victory over the Costa Ricans on a much 
larger scale. Walker could still wrest victory from defeat. 
Walker's fate now rested with the transit route and Southern 
extremists. Without that supp:>rt and the means for materiel to reach him, 
his defeat would follow quickly. He had to have a constant stream of 
supplies to continue his war. The only methoo of getting those supplies to 
him was the transit route. That route was the key objective for both sides 
ln the war. 
Walker lost that key to his survival in late December of 1856. This 
occurred shortly after Paulding's ship had arrived in Central Arrerican 
waters. During the last half of that month a contingent of Costa Rican 
troops closed the san Juan River portion of the transit route. They also 
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captured most of the transit steamers as well. 
These troops were armed with American rifles and had a forner 
Accessary Transit Co. river steamer captain, Sylvanus H. Spencer, in tCMI. 
Both were said to have been supplied by Vanderbilt. 142 However, how the 
rifles and Spencer got to Central America from the United States has never 
been explained. 
Paulding's possible arrival in Central American waters as early as 
the 8th of December could be an explanation. Paulding could have 
transported the materiel. Paulding sailed out of New York. New York was 
Vanderbilt's hometown and the best place to get rifles at that time. 
Shortly after Pauldmg arrived in Central American waters, those American 
rifles and Spencer turned up in Costa Rica. A few days later, Davis sailed 
to Punta Arenas and then jourmyed to San Jose. 143 Paulding could have 
had the guns and Spencer in San Jose as early as DecEml:::.er 12th. That was 
four days before the Costa Rican troops started their raid. 144 Davis 
could have been in San Jose by the 20th. It was possible to have all the 
players in the right places at the right time to be connected. 
If Spencer and the shipment of rifles were pa.rt of an Arrerican plan 
to cut Walker off from his supplies, then the presence of British army 
officers on that Costa Rican mission becorres even more i.rnp.Jrtant. Ehglish 
agents and soldiers were with that contmgent of Costa Rican troops. 145 
That joining of English agents with Arrerican rifles and an American 
citizen suggests Anglo-American cooperation in the closure of the San Juan 
River. It further suggests cooperation between the British and U.S. 
governrrents against Walker and his American associates. It removes any 
chance of walker being supported by official U.S. interests. 
If that possibility of American and British cooperation was a reality 
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in the fall of 1856, then it follOW's that Walker had becane a priority 
with both goverrurents. Thus, it lM:>uld seem that roth the U.S. and Britain 
had decided to rEmove Walker's filibusters from Nicaragua in complete 
secrecy. This is obvious because neither country put regular troops into 
the region. Whatever official records were kept in the United States were 
destroyed afterward. There is no published record of a British interest In 
Costa Rican actions along the San Juan river. Neither country wanted to be 
held accountable. 
This need for secrecy probably resulted from a canbination of u.S. 
sectionalism, U.S. and Central American anglophobia, British commercial 
interests in the southern U.S., and popular support for Walker in the U.S. 
The two goverrurents were forced to restrict their options to those that 
were canpletely secret out of what must have been a fear of popular 
opinion in the U.S. breaking apa.rt the fragile Union that existed in 1856 
or disrupting the profitable U.S.-British cotton trade. 
The closing of the transit stopped pa.ssenger and freight traffic. 
Nothing could run up or dOW'n the river without having to battle Costa 
Rican troops along the way. Without the pa.ssengers and freight, there were 
no profits to be made on the transit. Without profits there VJas no 
commercia 1 reason to sai 1 ships dONIl to Nicaragua. 
When the news of this became knONIl in New York and san Francisco, 
Morgan and Garrison did the practical thing: they decked their ships. 146 
Walker VJaS, thereafter, canpletely isolated fran any resupply. 
The severing of the transit was a blow from which Walker could never 
recover. He was cut off fran his Southern sympa.thizers. After December of 
1856, every nan he lost and every bullet he expended became 
irreplaceable. The war nOW' became a VJar of attrition. It was only a matter 
of time before walker's army lM:>uld be a hollow shell. This VJaS a type of 
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war Walker could never win. The Central Americans would be victorious. 
It was at this time that Walker 'Was isolated even further. 'l'he Costa 
Ricans amended their earlier declaration of war to exclude from the 
conflict all Americans except William Walker and anyone who elected to 
fight with him. Anyone else was not considered an enemy and was free to 
leave the battlefield ururolested. 147 This amendment was another 
carefully worded declaration that reflected a higher sense of diplomacy 
than the Costa Ricans had sho..-m in the past. With that change, Walker's 
men could leave him without fear of instant death at the hands of the 
first Conservative troops they encountered. Walker's rren had an escape. 
They responded by deserting in large numbers. 
That new declaration 'Was canpletely out of character for the Costa 
Ricans. They had murdered every captured filibuster up to that point. 
EiTotions v..ere at a fever pitch with victory close at ham. It would have 
been unlikely for them to have voluntarily decided to treat their enemies 
with any rrercy after the earlier defeats. Hcwever, it would have been 
likely if another country had included such a demand in exchange for 
supporting a Conservative victory. Camander Davis, who spent time in S3.n 
Jose shortly after he arrived in Central America, was just the man to have 
effected such a condition. 
Despite all of this, Walker still managed to hold out for another 
four rronths. It was on the 1st of May 1857 when he finally surrendered the 
pitiful remains of his exhausted army. Wa lker had f inall y given up after 
being trapPed in the village of Rivas by the corrbined armies of his 
Conservative enemies. It 'Was only when his fate was certain that Walker 
gave up. 148 
Walker did not surrender to the Central Americans, but to Davis and 
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the U.S. government. Walker and his arITl'j were guaranteed safe passage out 
of the region by Davis and the United States. The Conservatives were 
cheated out of their revenge for past defeats. Walker was gone after 
twenty-two months . 
The surrender of Walker to Davis further implies the existence of a 
secret plot to bring alxmt th~ end of walker's expedition. By keeping 
Walker alive and getting his wretched army back to New York, the U.S. 
government could expect to allay several fears. The first was that of 
Walker becoming lrore of a hero in the U.S. Once dead, Walker and his 
expedition could have been eulogized by Southern extrenists. Alive, he 
would have had to face his failed dream, and answer for thousands of dead 
men. selected newspar;ers would then have the opportunity to discredit 
him with horrible "firsthand" accounts of his "madness". This did occur 
after his return. 149 second was the possibility of a rabid hatred of 
those responsible for murdering Walker, if he had been killed. That would 
have opened the possibility of other expeditions heading down to exact 
some sort revenge for Walker's death. With Walker alive, the chance for 
more expeditions was l~ss likely. Walker and his army were apparently 
rescued and removed from Nicaragua to prevent Walker from becoming a 
rallying r:oint for rrore efforts at conquest in Central .America. 
This last developrrent of the Walker expedition was duly reported by 
Davis in several dispatches. 150 These dispatches were not recorded and 
apparently destroyed. 151 That treabnent of the Davis dispatches is 
suggested by the verification of their existence in a letter from a State 
Department special agent sent down in the summer of 1857. 152 
M3.y 1, 1857 marked the end of Walker's first expedition into 
Nicaragua. He did try to reenter the country over the next three years, 
but was never successful. In late 1857, Paulding captured Walker in san 
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Juan del Norte after a brief standoff. In 1860, Walker tried again. 
Shortly after landing in northern Honduras, he was captured by a British 
Naval Officer and turned over to a Conservative Honduran government. He 
died by firing squad shortly afterward. 153 
The Nicaraguan Transit Co. ended as a viable sh~pping canpany when 
Walker left Nicaragua that M3.y. Morgan and G3.rrison lost interest. 
Vanderbil t regained the opportunity to reopen the route, but he never did 
so. He was still getting $56,000 per month from the Panama lines in the 
S1..UT1ITer of 1857. That payrrent, almost $700,000 per year, was app3.rently 
more than he could make with the transit op2!l, so Vanderbilt was content 
to leave his ships in other trade. He aoondoned the transit. It never 
reopened. 
The war ended any Liberal threat to Conservative rule in Nicaragua 
for the next two generations. Conservative governments ruled without any 
significant disruptions. Liberals, politically identified with Walker and 
seen as lacking in Nicaraguan nationalism, ~re canpletely discredited. 
Conservatives reaffirmed the more traditional values of Church and states' 
rights. Nicaraguans settled dONn to the slow process of rebuilding the 
exhausted country. Peace returned. 
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CON:LUSION 
With the end of Walker's expedition to Nicaragua in May of 1857, the 
first economic encounter between Nicaragua and the United States came to a 
climax. For the next several years, there were multiple attempts at 
reopening the transit, but these 'M2re unsuccessful. Then, the U.S. Civil 
War erupted and foreign econanic interests within the U.S. diminished. For 
four years there was little U. S. interest in Central Arrerica. 
Because of this war-induced interruption in U.S. invesbnent, Walker's 
eXPedition marked the natural end of a cycle. His intervention in 
Nicaragua was the culmination of first attempts at establishing 
relationships between the two countries. It was a period of change from 
colonial, mercantile relationships to free trade relationships between 
independent states. 
The events comprising this history of Nicaragua with respect to 
foreign powers will be examined in relation to the basic premises 
presented in the introduction. :Each of these criterion for dependency will 
be examined in turn. 
The firs t of these indicators of dependency, that of a trend taward 
inter-elite collusion will be examined in two p3.rts. First, this factor 
will be examined by carrparing the app3.rent official government policies in 
response to occurrences in Central America to the criterion of collusion 
between governmental and business elites as predicted by dependency 
theorists. This will encanp3.ss the official responses by England and the 
united States to the actions by their countrymen engaged in commercial 
activities. Then the various alliances between the various Nicaraguan 
factions will be examined. 
England was the first foreign power to have commercial interests in 
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Central America. British businessmen were active in· logging and trade even 
before the collapse of the Spanish }~rnpi:r-e. British consuls were the first 
European diplanats on the scene. Official British support for Brit.ish 
businessmen can be dated from the arrival of the first Sri tish consul to 
Central ronerica in 1834. 
Frederick Chatfield arrived in Guatamala City to present himself to 
the Central Arrerican Federation in that year. 'rhat v.Bak federal republic 
was still the ruling government in the region and Chatfield dealt with its 
representatives in Guatama.la City. He negotiated and signed vanous 
commercial treaties, but he never extended diplomatic recognition. 
That stance by Britain, a pragmatic acceptance coupled with a refusal 
to officially recognize the republic, was a realistic policy for that 
time. It nay have reflected both a larger interest on the part of Britain 
with respect to the increasingly popular federal system of government and 
caution on the part of British officials. This was because Britain, under 
a parliarrentary monarchy, did not have a" universal male suffrage. For 
Britain to accept and openly support federal governments which encouraged 
such suffrage, it seems, would have been self-defeating in view of its 
own form of government at that time in history. Britain could not do this 
OPenly. 
Chatfield was more interested in supporting commercial interests than 
In engaging in official diplanacy in Central Arrerica. Along with a policy 
of diplanatic distance, Chatfield kept a personal distance. He developed 
a personal dislike of Central Arrericans and their v-Bak governments. This 
attitude, coupled with his interest in supporting English commercial 
interests, culminated in his attempt to force Britain into honoring his 
declaration of a protectorate along the Mosquito Shore in 1837. This 
86. 
coincided with a period of political confusion in England. 
1837 was the first year of Queen Victoria's sixty-four year rule. 154 
Coronations were nonnally a confusing transition period, but this one was 
more confusing because the new m:march was only a young girl of eighteen 
at the tine: Chatfield, an astute political observer, undoubtedly was 
atterrpting to capitalize on this possible state of confusion in London 
when he made his bold move. He was in 'error. wndon rebuffed his rTIanuever. 
Chatfield was forced to retract his pronouncement of a protectorate. 
The declaration was a blatant atterrpt to support conmercial 
interests. Chatfield acted without any known instructions. It is fairly 
obvious that Chatfield was attempting to gain official British control 
over land which produced valuable lumber. It was an attempt to galn an 
advantage for his merchant countrymen over the Central American claimants 
of that land. With the primary product from that region being mahCXjany, it 
lS possible that mahogany exporters were behind the manuever. 
Chatfield's declaration fits the sort of behavior predicted by 
de~ndency theor ists .. Chatf ield was attempting to use his position to 
remove a potential source of revenue fran a less develcped Central 
America. He completed the first step in trying to exploit Central 
Arrericans. At that point, according to the theory, london should have 
followed that declaration with an official approval of Chatfield's action. 
However, there was no such approval. wndon forced Chatfield to retreat 
fran his position. 
This runs counter to the premise that the exploitation of a dependent 
nation by a dominant nation is a matter of state policy. Britain 
officially refused to support Englishmen over the sovereign rights of the 
central Arrerican Federation. In doing so, Britain supported the legal 
claim of an established government rather than extra-legal exploitation by 
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English merchants. 
On the other hand, Chatf ield's dec laration of a protectorate in 
collusion with British commercial interests can be said to be indicative 
of incipient dependency. It marks an apparent willingness on the part of 
at least governrrent officials to conspire with camrercial interests in the 
exploitation of a less developed nation. 
Later, in 1839,- Chatfield changed his policies and began 6upporting 
the government· 'to which he had issued his Mosquito Protectorate 
declaration in 1837. By 1839, the weak Central Am2rican Federation was 
collapsing. Chatfield attempted to slow that collapse. He refused to deal 
with any new state until the end of that republic was inevitable. Only 
the~ did Chatfield begin to deal with the five new iridependent nations. 
This marked .a shift from his supporting the Liberal to the Conservative 
factions in Central lImerica 
Chatfield's behavior in 1839 was not in keeping with what would have 
been expected within the framework of dependency theory which states, In 
IIpart, that, the dependent countries are placed in a backward 
situation and under the exploitation of the daninant countries." 155 Under 
that assumption, Chatfield should have welcomed the failure of central 
government in the region. It \\Duld have been his opportunity to gain more 
benefit for English businesses through negotiating newer and more liberal 
concessions with ¥.Baker governments. It also \\Duld have been a gCX)(j time 
to reinstate his Mosquito Protectorate. Yet, that was not the case 
Chatfield seemed to be more interested in safeguarding established 
concessions rather than in exploiting new Central lImerican weaknesses in 
order to gain better concessions. He seEmed to want a viable Central 
lImerican Federation, i.e'. capable federal governrrent rather than weaker, 
more fragmented, and more penetrable national political systems. Only when 
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that opr;ortunity was lost did he deal with the five separate countries. 
Chatfield's - supr;ort of the Central Alrerican Federa.tion in its 
twilight is a rather new discovery in historical research. In his The 
. 
Failure of Union: Central Alrerica, 1824-1960, Thomas L. Karnes offers-
letters fran Chatfield indicating both his refusal to recognize this 
rebellion and to deal with the separate governments. 156 This new 
evidence refutes earlier conclusions to the contrary in other published 
sources. 157 
These early historical researchers proposed t~e thesis that Frederick 
Chatfield intentionally destroyed the Central Alrerican Federation in order 
to gain economic advantage. Such research would bolster the prerrdse of 
daninant countries forcing der;:endent countries into a backward situation. 
Kames more in-depth research has disclosed flaws comron to earlier 
accounts am, while doing so, presents a situation in which dePendency 
assertions are not supported. 
The Chatfield episode does not, on the whole, supr;ort the dependency 
premise of state-directed e~loitatio~. However, Chatfield's inaction nay 
have owed more to the reigning confusion and chaos than any planning on 
his part. 
It was shortly after the collapse of the Central American Federation 
that Chatfield once again brought his idea of a Mosquito Protectorate to 
London. This time he included the Atlantic port of San Juan del Norte in 
the territory he wanted within the protectorate. This was another effort 
at promoting British commercial interests. It did receive sane support 
fran the Foreign Office in London, but still the idea languished In 
Parliament. It was not until 1844 that Chatfield's idea was given official 
sanction. 
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At this point, the events in Central America do fit .dep:=ndency 
theorist views on collusion between government and business. The Mosquito 
Protectorate did afford camnercial advantage to Britain at the expense of 
Central Alrericans. Coincidentally, sane Mosquito Indians benefitted as a 
result of that declaration. 
1he official position of the British government was that there was. a 
valid reason for British protection of the Mosquito Indians. The main 
reasoning behind that view was that the M9sguito Coast region of Nicaragua 
and Honduras was almost an independent country that had little In canrron 
with the Spanish region of the Pacific Coast. The British government 
insisted the protectorate was needed to preserve the independence of the 
indians. 
'rhere is validity in that view because the eastern third of Nicaragua 
was inhabited by a collection of Indians and Blacks from allover the 
Caribbean. These people were mostly English-speaking. They had rrore 
camnercial ties with England than wi-th Nicaragua and viewed Nicaraguans 
fran the Pacific Coast as foreigners more so thpn they. did the British. 
While Nicaragua 'claimed that territorl because of its former status as a 
Spanish territory, there was roan for a question of actual ownership. 
Because the British action was·neither a clear case of exploitation 
nor support for an independence movement, the former possibility, which is 
in keeping with dependency perspectives, should not be dismissed. 
Britain did have a legal justification for protecting the Mosquito 
people. Nicaragua was in a state of rebellion from the established federal 
government at the time. Nicaragua's historic claim to the territory, based 
upon Spanish control before independence~ was weak in light of that 
revolt. This made the Mosquito Protectorate even more of a muddled issue. 
British claims seem to have had validity in a legal sense. Despite the 
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questions over legality and purpose, the matter was settled in Nicaragua's 
favor as a political expedient in 1859. 
It was and still is a confused issue. The people of the sparsely­
settled Atlantic coa~t of Nicaragua have attempted to gain autonomy from 
both the new Sandinista regime and its predecessors. These Indian and 
Black people have been unsuccessful in gaining official autonomy, yet.have 
managed to exist in a quasi-seclusion fran the more developed western 
coast until just recently. It was only in the last generation' that a hard 
surface road even connected 'the two cultures. 
Nicaragua did not recognize the British declaration of the Mosquito 
Protectorate until forced to do so in 1848. The Nicaraguan President did 
this only after British troq:Js had defeated the Nicaraguans in ba.ttle. 
That warfare brought the United States into Central America., Basing 
its interest on t-bnroe Doctrine principles, the United States sent a 
minister, Elijah Hise, to Guatamala City in 1848. Hise sided with the 
Central Arrericans against Britain. He Came to prorrote closer ties retween 
the U.S. and Central America ~nd to enCourage the forrretion of another 
republic of the five separate states. 
This U.S. aim of creating a stronger nation is not in keeping with 
what \\QuId have reen expected under dependency theory. The United States 
was officially interested in having strong go~ernment in Central America. 
As a part of this off icia 1 policy, the U. S. wanted British renunciation of 
all territorial claims and free trade in the region during all of the 
1850's. As part of this stance, the United States never officially 
recognized the Mosquito Protectorate. U.S. State Department instructions 
~re very explicit concerning the develorxnent of stronger regional 
government. 
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In relations between government and business, the united States 
government maintained an official independence fran business endeavors. 
This was evident in an absence of obvious government support or hindrance. 
While u.S. rrcinisters did negotiate a treaty concession for a specific 
canpany before Walker's expedition, the minister, Squire, was instJ;"ucted 
to keep official u.S. government guarantees out of the negotiations. 
Throughout all the difficulties between the Accessary Transit Co. and 
Nicaragua, the U. S. governrrent refused to intercEde on ei ther p3rty ,s 
behalf. 
S'uch evidence is not indicative of state-directed implantation of 
dependency during initial u.S. entry into the region. There was no 
specific evidence of governmental action to support dependency assertions 
uncovered by the research. 
There are only two instances of official u.S. action over an 
Accessary Transit Co. difficulty before Walker's expedition. Both of 
these were over difficulties with Brltish officials. 
The first was the Proiretheus Affair of 1851. That incident was 
instigated by British officials in San Juan del Norte because of their 
dislike of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The" affair was specifically 
addressed as a matter of whether or not a treaty violation by one 
signatory could go unpunished by another. Officially, the U.S. decided 
that it could not allow British officials to violate a treaty' without 
risking other violations of other treaties. TherefOre, the U.S. Navy was 
ordered to press the 'issue in Nicaragua. 
The Prorretheus Affair was an attEmpt on the pa.rt of local British 
agents to force the continuation of a commercial relationship. It was 
another example of British use of force in aiding commercial interests 
ill urninated by the research for this thesis. 
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The second of the two incidents involving official U.S. action In 
Nicaragua was the banbardment of San Juan del Norte by the U.S. s. Cyane In 
the summer of 1854. The actual shelling of the town did not appear to be 
authorized. It served little purpose outside of giving the local 
inhabitants a healthy respect for u.s. firepower. There was no clear 
connection between this bcmbardment and the exploitation of the Mosquito 
Indians or collusion beto;..een U. S. business and goverrurent in achieving 
cc:mrercial advantage. From available data, it would appear that the naval 
attack was nothing more than a violent reaction to threats against U.S. 
nationals. It was apparently an act governed by the ship captain's 
frustration rather than any plan of weakening Mosquito Indian sovereignty, 
although that might have been the overall result. 
By the end of 1854, British influence in Central Arrerica was much 
diminished by British involvement in the Crimean War. British merchants 
were more isolated than ever. U.S. merchants gained more freedan of 
action. Still, the evidence points to a lack of official U.S. support of 
private business. This reflects an official desire of allc::r:wing American 
business the total of benefit arrl risk in Central America. This also 
seerred to be the case during the walker expedition. 
The only u.s. official to openly act in favor of Walker arrl encourage 
U.S. involvement on his behalf was the U.S. minister, John Wheeler. He was 
relieved of his post because of these actions. All of Wheeler's efforts to 
help Walker o;..ere futile. The State Department refused to.honor any of 
Wheeler's official actions or suggestions. 
The official U.S. response to Walker was negative. President Pierce 
attempted to prosecute recruits heading for Walker's army arrl to stop 
supplies from reaching him. Ap3.rt from a brief recognition of the RiVdS 
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government, the U.S. refused to grant diploTBtic recognition or to welcome 
any emissaries fran Nicaragua. President Pierce v..Duld not lend any 
official legitirracy to Walker's filibustering. Circumstancial evidence 
the possible Anglo-Arrerican mission to close the San Juan River lI! 
December of 1856 -- even points to President Pierce having organiZed a 
secretive plot to bring about Walker's·downfall. 
President pierce also refused to t~e sides in the Wall Street 
battles 
~ 
over ownership of the Accessary Transit Co. Other officials acted 
in a similar manner. The Secreta'ry 'of State refused to becorre involved 
with any ot" the difficulties. The Attorney General harassed captains of 
the Accessary Transit Co. ships. The aClministration would not take sides 
with any party in the struggles. Officially, the officials v..Duld only 
uphold the letter of ~the law, and that meant -prosecution of neutrality law 
violators. 
This evidence does not coincide closely with dependency theory. 
According to the dependency premises presented in the Introduction, the 
U.S. should have recognized Walker's provisional ·government and allowed 
recruits to travel to Nicaragua. That did not seem to be the case. 
Apparent1y, the U.S. government rejected private military intervention 
within a sovereign state. 
The second premise in the fra:rrework, that of the use of force to aid 
in canrrercial exploitation, is delineated by Gunter Frank in' his assertion 
that, " .. ~. [the 'dominant] po~rs aided the Latin American junior trading 
partners with arms, naval blockades, and, where necessary, direct military 
intervention and instigation of new wars." 158 This' sounds plausible when 
considering Chatfield's methods and Walker's warfare. Ho~ver, the 
evidence does not always neatly support such an assertion. 
Frederick Chatfield used naval blockades against various ports. His 
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damage-claim blockade of Nicaragua, discussed earlier, is a case in point. 
In this blockade of Nicaragua during the fall of 1842, Chatfield's stated 
purpose was to coerce Central Americans into action on a specific demand. 
There was no apparent long-term support of a specific group of rrerchants 
over any other group. Chatfield applied the blockade against all trade 
coming out of Nicaragua. Then, once the Nicaraguans came to terms, that 
blockade was lifted. 
While the blockade was clearly detrimental to Nicaraguan sovereignty 
and in keeping with the overall thrust of dependency argurrents, there was 
a noteworthy variation fran dependency theory apparent in this rraneuver. 
Dependency theorists' do consider the use of naval blockades to l:€ an 
inperialistic tool in forcing dependency ufOn underdeveloped nations, but 
they qualify such military action as a rreans to SUbjugate, ". .. the 
more industrial and, therefore, more nationalistic sector. of the 
bourgeoisie." 159 Such was not the case in this example. All rolitical 
groups in Nicaragua suffered equally during this blockade. 
Chatfield's use of land-based military intervention was apparently 
limited to the British declaration and protection of the Mosquito 
Protectorate. English troops landed at san Juan del Norte in 1848 to 
rerrove Nicaraguan encroachment into that town. 
In addition to blockades and military intervention, the. British sold 
anns and offered military expertise in Central ~nerica. English merchants 
sold arms to both Lil:€rals and Conseratives. Englishmen. fought for 
private gain with various armies. Overall, the official British policy was 
circumsPect. First the Foreign Office supported the republic and the 
Liberal s, then it supfOrted the separate states and the Conservatives. 
This shifting fOlicy and arms dealing by the British does not clearly 
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support the premise that more industrialized countries have historically 
allied with the least nationalistic sector of less developed countries in 
order to reduce the independence of those countries. British interests 
shi fted as Central Alrerica changed in the period betv,een Central Arrerican 
independence and Walker's defeat. Apart fran the Mosquito Protectorate, 
. 
the general drift of English support was to the stronger government and 
more nationalistic group. This is borne out by Chatfield's support of the 
Liberal cause under the re'public and the Conservative cause during 
Walker's expedition. 
Walker's expedition was the first United States military 
intervention, albeit as a private endeavor, in Central Arrerica; As an 
exarrple of tnili tary intervention in support of a ccmrercial interest, it 
does fit the sort of militarism that dependency theorists claim has been a 
tool of dominant nations. Yet, there is also a departure from the 
dependency premises to the extent that Walker initially supported the mare 
nationalistic and developrrent-minded of the two major factions in Central 
Anerica. Walker wanted to create a new Central Arrerican Federation, a 
powerful state under his, not U.S. control. When his intentions became 
clear with his assumption of the presidency, his Liberal supporters 
largely abandoned him. 
For the most part, Walker's attempt at conquest in" Central America 
lies outside of dependency theory explanations of intervention. Walker's 
military intervention Was not state-supported exploitation of another 
country for economic gain. The assertion that military intervention within 
Central America in the early 19th Century was aimed solely at fostering 
dependency in the region is w=akened. Unlike the earlier British 
intervention, which served a specific cornrercial interest, Walker's 
expedi tion did not serve the express purpose of producing a more dependent 
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trading partner as part of a larger patteTI1 of dependent relationships. 
Walker was apparently seeking to create a PJv.erful nation illlder his 
personal control. 
The sum of this military involvement by outside PJwers within the 
civil wars and the National War does not much support dependency theory. 
There was no apparent long-term policy of weakening the collective 
. 
PJlitical strength or independence of the regibn, although this may have 
been the net effect of U.S. and British actions. Military action by these 
foreign pov.ers during th,is period was ad hoc, with much of it undertaken 
by individual mavericks on the scene. 
The premise that treaties would be inherently exploitive is not 
supported by the evidence. There is no clear example of a treaty being 
one-sided as written or being part of any specific state policy of 
weakening Central American sovereignty. None seems to have been clearly 
exploitive. Fran the tenns of concessions that are available in the 
published sources, Central Americans seem to have benefited from these 
early treaties as much as foreign cc:mrercial interests. 
However, sane treaties are unavailable for review, and the degree to 
which treaties were honored is problematic, as will be shown below. rrhe 
various concessions that ,Chatfield negotiated during his eighteen years in 
Central America are unavailable in the published sources consulted for 
this study. Therefore, the fairness of any terms and adherence to thC6e 
tenns cannot be determined. However, based uPJn Chatfield's strained 
relations with his Central Arrerican peers, it would be lcgical t<;> assume 
that overly generous terms were unlikely in any concession to England. In 
general, Chatfield himself was almost universally hated by his Central 
American counterparts. It is doubtful that Central Americans wQuld have 
97.
 
willingly sufferErl the public embarrassment of having others know of any 
generous terms granted tha t man. 
Unlike the British secrecy -surrounding concessions, the various 
treaties signed between U.s. representati~es dnd Central Arrericans are 
generally available. Of the five treaties signErl with the Nicaraguans by 
U.s. ministers and private individuals during this pericrl, all but one are 
available for study. None of those available appears to be unfair. These 
concessions were potentially profitable to both' signatories. 
The transit treaty, signed by Vanderbilt in 1851, was the only 
treaty tha t became a working agreerrent. By the terms of the concession, 
the Nicaraguans were guaranteed at l~~st $10,000 annually and as much as 
$35,000 annually without any risk or effort on their part. 
The terms of the Morgan concession were never revealed. However, the 
events surrounding" the signing of that concession and Rivas' quick 
departure afterward would lead one to conclude that the terms were deemErl 
unfair by Rivas. 
On the whole, the cha:r;acter of these treaties runs counter to 
dependency theory assUIDI?tions that treaties signed by the -less" develop2d 
countries are necessarily exploitative as part of an emerging policy and 
pattern of dependence. The teITl)S of the Vanderbi 1t agreement were 
generous. They providErl a potential source of industrial develq::rnent as 
well as trade within Nicaragua. The Morgan concession Hay or may not have 
been exploi tive and was of questionable legality because it was signed by 
an unreccgnized government. Whether or not the terms of these treaties 
were honorErl will be discussErl later. The lack of any official U.s. 
support for either holder of a concession, as revealed by President 
Pierce's proclamation against service with Walker and the Attorney 
General's action against Walker supporters, does call into question the 
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extent to which the U.S. government was acting consistently on the behalf 
of any set of American business interests. 
However, indivictuals' exploitation of Nicaragua. by reneging on 
treaties does seem to have occurred according to dependency theorist 
claims. Adherence to the terms of Vanderbilt's treaty by company officials 
was PJOr at best. These officials apparently cheated the Nicaraguans every 
year. Yet, Nicaraguan efforts to gain those payments were strangely mild­
mannered. The lack of action to gain payment,- other than filing suit in 
the New York courts, implies secretive payments of some sort. 
Honesty bet~en business partners was apparently a fairly uncamron 
practice in those. years. Company officers of the Atlantic and Pacific Ship 
Canal Co. apparently misled speculators in the canal rond issue to the 
extent of some $3,000 per bond. It was very likely that these officers had 
foreknowledge of the reluctance by British bankers to finance any canal 
scheme in Nicaragua. Vanderbilt, for example, had a-surprising lack of 
interest in the collapse of his bond issue and did not lose any money_ 
This is a strong indication that Vanderbilt knew and kept secret the truth 
arout British intentions. 
It was that same summer that the Nicaraguans were seemingly cheated 
for the first time over their profit ~haring agreement. Vanderbilt's rapid 
divesti ture of his Accessary Transi t Co. investments shortly afterward 
indicates his belief that the payments ~re not made .. It also indicates 
that Vanderbilt was worried that the Nicaraguans would close his route and 
ruin the canpany over lack, of proper payment. . 
The subsequent continuation of transit operations and Morgan's 
interest in assuming management of that canpany llBkes sense only if he was 
sure that the concession would not be revoked .. That could only have been 
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assured through payrrent of the required anount to Nicaragua. It. would 
follow then that Morgan fooled Vahderbi It and cheated him out of his 
canpany. 
That, in turn, means that the Nicaraguans were pawns in that sUIT1lrer' s 
ruthless financial dealings in New York. What appeared to have been 
cheating may only have been a facade. If so, then Nicaragua prote.bly did 
get -paid. This does go against the individual bits of evidence discovered 
by earlier scholars yet it can be supported by logical deduction. The 
conclusion that there v..Bre payoffs to Nicaragua is supported by the 
assumption that. Morgan would have taken the safer course of cheating 
Vanderbilt. 
The follONing year the Nicaraguans were cheated. There is substantial 
evidence for this. It was an occurrence in keeping with the concept of 
exploitation presented as a part of dependency theory. 
In the five years of transit operations before Vanderbilt's 
concession was revok€d, the different directors of the canp3ny cheated 
investors, the Nicaraguans, and Vanderbilt out of' dividends, profit 
sharing, and fees due. Charl-eE? Morgan ap-parently was the mastennind behind 
most of these dealings, but Cornelius Garrison was also equal to the task. 
While records of these financial dealing? were incomplete for various 
reasons, what is recorded leaves little doubt as to their unscrupulous 
business deal ings. That sort of behavior makes any connection between 
Walker and one of those rren all the rrore plausible. 
While the real reason behind Walker's interest and subsequent 
expedition into Nicaragua will never be ccnpletely understocxi, the timing 
of events and the variety of people with an interest in keeping him there 
points to the two directors as the catalyst behind the exp:rlition. In the 
·face of the recently canpleted Panarranian railroad, Vanderbilt's 
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canr::etition, and Nicaraguan troubl es, Wa lker ' s entry into the Nicaraguan 
civil war and his revocation of 'the Vanderbilt concession offered Morgan 
and Garrison the opportunity to realize a healthy profit before their 
or::eration conapsed under the strain of canr::etition. In exchange for an 
estimated $50,000 investment in ~valker, these two men would have gained 
well over $250,000. 
The tempJrary nature of Morgan and Garrison's sUPPJrt for Walker is 
evident in their actions after'the March revocation of Vanderbilt's 
concession and Morgan's stock manipulations'. They had little interest in 
the transit after March .. Garrison had TIDved into the b:mking industry 
again. He founded the original Bank of California in the midst of the 
revocation manuever. 160 Morgan was using his profits fro~ the transit 
route to exp3.nd his Gulf of Mexico lines and Louisiaha railroads, not to 
improve the Nicaragua traffic. 161 The only reason the two continued to 
or::erate ships to Nicaragua was the absence of any substantial' financial 
ri sk involved with the trade. They were more than ready to leave the 
Nicaraguan transit and readiLy did so when Costa Rican troops closed the 
river portion in eastern Nicaragua. 
A significant claim of the various der::endency theorists cited in this 
thesis, and one that is a canmon thread throughout dependency literature, 
is that of collusion between daninant-nation elites and counterpo.rt 
collaborative elites in the client state. This was evident' in this episode 
of Central American history. Various groups 'within the region were willing 
to seek foreign assistance in a variety of circumstances. 
Several examples of such behavior were evident in sr::ecific instances. 
American interests were enlisted into the Liberal cause as a counter to 
British interests in the reg'ion. This was evident in the Hise-S€l va 
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Convention, the Tigre- Island Incident, and the Walker expedition 
invitation. British assistance in countering walker was courted by 
Conservatives during the National War and the subsequent Walker landing ln 
Honduras. 
The examples of collusion, such as that predicted by dependency 
theory, ~re not explored further due to the larger scope of this thesis. 
However, the circurnstancial evidence of such collusion, such as the 
apparent foreign involvement in the closing of the san Juan River in 
December of 1856, should be researched further. The discovery of 1inks of 
that sort, if such a trend can be detected, could prove to be a 
significant addition to any understanding of decision-making in such 
incidents. 
In sum, various aspects of dependency theory are SUPI=Drted by this 
investigation of the William Walker expedition of 1855-7. A qualified 
assertion that there were examples of incipient dependency discernible 
within the evolution of walker's expedition can be made with confidence. 
That assertion needs to be qualified in that this evidence was lacking ln 
any clear indication of state policy in- implanting dependency or any 
consistent support of less nationalistic groups in Central American 
society by a foreign power. 
The added complexity of the U.S. -British comrrercial COInr:eti tion arid 
the growing hostility between North and South in the United States played 
a significant yet obscure role. A lack of solid evidence in the lnaterials 
researched leaves the extent and nature of those roles largely unanswered 
and open to speculation. Comrrercial canpetition may have affected the 
consistent support of anyone faction or the need for collusion between 
factions within the various countries. This could explain the ready 
shi fting or allegiances evident in this study. The North-South hostilify 
may have governed official action -- i.e. the lack of official support of 
Walker -- and restricted the scope of foreign policy rrore than is apparent 
fran the evidenoe. These questions can only be answered through lIDre 
research of additional rraterials. 
The several significant, consistent linkages between actual events 
and dependency-related premises revealed in this thesis shou'ld be 
investigated further. Chief arrong these were the apparent willingness of 
local British agents to intervene in central Arrerica 'to aid British 
comrercial interests, the willingness of American businessmen ,to cheat 
Central Americans, and decision-making behind the use of military 
intervention in achieving commercial benefit. 
Wlile linkages b2tween actual events and depemency theory premises 
were discovered, a clear association with state-sponsored policy was not 
certain. An evolution of state-sponsored fXJlicy would be strong evidence 
in support of dependency theory. Further empirical research, using a case 
study approach, such as that attempted in this thesis, is needed to add 
dimensionality to dependency and other theories of underdevelopment as 
well as to strengthen their predictive and explanatory value. 
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